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FEDERAL IMMIGRATION DETAINERS AFTER 
ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES 
Christopher N. Lasch* 
          In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court held that three of 
the four challenged provisions to Arizona’s “Support Our Law 
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” were preempted. The Court 
reached this conclusion by focusing on the federal government’s 
supremacy in immigration enforcement. Ironically, the Court’s focus on 
federal supremacy undermines the executive branch’s central 
enforcement measure for obtaining custody of suspected immigration 
violators: immigration detainers. 
          The executive branch issues over a quarter million immigration 
detainers each year to state and local law officials. These detainers 
command state and local officials to hold a prisoner, who would 
otherwise be released, in custody awaiting pickup by federal 
immigration officials. This Article examines the immigration detainer 
program under the analytical framework provided by the Court’s 
Arizona decision. This Article proceeds by first describing the Arizona 
decision and its underlying analytical framework. It then analyzes 
immigration detainers within this framework, concluding that the 
federal immigration detainer regulation is ultra vires and raises 
substantial constitutional questions. Ultimately, this Article shows that 
the Arizona decision will have significant impact on immigration 
enforcement beyond the question of allocation of enforcement authority 
between the federal government and state and local governments.
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“This is not the system Congress created.”
1
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Immigration law always implicates civil rights,
2
 and the past 
twenty years have seen an increasing importance for immigration as 
a major civil rights battleground.
3
 A perceived immigration crisis
4
 
intensified the heat of pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant sentiment 
and brought immigration federalism issues from a simmer to a full 
boil. Those seeking more vigorous immigration enforcement and 
those seeking an expansion of immigrant rights alike attacked federal 
immigration policy as a failed endeavor.
5
 Both groups sought change 
at the state and local levels, but through radically different programs. 
Anti-immigrant groups persuaded some state and local governments 
to pass measures supplementing federal immigration enforcement 
efforts
6
—purportedly grounded in the “inherent authority” of state 
sovereign governments to regulate immigration. Meanwhile 
immigrants’ rights advocates, decrying federal enforcement 
measures tainted by racial profiling and constitutionally suspect 
home and workplace raids, lobbied local governments to disentangle 
 
 1. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012). 
 2. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS 1 (2004) (“[T]he U.S. government’s treatment of immigrants is inextricably linked to the 
efforts of domestic minorities to secure civil rights.”). 
 3. See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate 
Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609, 638 (2012) (“Immigration is one of the dominant civil rights 
issues of the twenty-first century. The recent spate of state and local efforts seeking to regulate 
immigration demonstrate this basic truth.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Linda Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1994) (“Rising American concern over a perceived immigration 
crisis makes it a virtual certainty that courts will once again grapple with questions concerning the 
meaning and significance of alienage as a legal status category.”); María Pabón López, 
Reflections on Educating Latino and Latina Undocumented Children: Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 35 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1373, 1373–74 (2005) (“Census 2000 highlighted the reality of the 
increased number of noncitizens in the country, particularly Latinos, and has precipitated a 
renewal of nationwide concern over an ‘immigration crisis.’”) (citations omitted). 
 5. Johnson, supra note 3, at 615–17. 
 6. See infra notes 43–44 and accompanying text (discussing local anti-immigrant measures 
such as those passed in Hazleton, Pennsylvania); infra note 46 (discussing state legislative 
measures). 
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state and local law enforcement from federal immigration 
enforcement,
7
 resist cooperation, and create “sanctuary cities.”
8
 





 the end of the story of one such local effort: 
Arizona’s “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods 
Act,” colloquially known simply as “S.B. 1070,”
11
 enacted at the 
behest of anti-immigration lobbyists frustrated by what they believed 
to be the federal government’s failure to sufficiently enforce the 
Nation’s immigration laws. Hailed as a landmark decision of historic 
proportions,
12
 Arizona struck down three of the four challenged 
sections of S.B. 1070.
13
 Two of the three provisions struck down 
created state crimes to punish immigrants for not carrying federally 
required registration documents
14
 and for seeking work without 
authorization;
15
 the third provision expanded state arrest authority to 
allow police to arrest suspected immigration violators.
16
 The Court 
 
 7. See infra notes 274–286 and accompanying text (discussing state and local resistance to 
federal immigration enforcement). 
 8. A sanctuary city may be characterized as one in which local law “limit[s] government 
employees, particularly local police officers, from inquiring or disseminating information about 
the immigration status of immigrants whom they encounter.” Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a 
‘Sanctuary’?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 148 (2008). San Francisco describes its “City and County of 
Refuge” ordinance in similar terms, connecting its ordinance to both the faith-based sanctuary 
movement of the 1980s and the post-9/11 “New Sanctuary Movement.” Sanctuary Ordinance, 
CITY & COUNTY OF S.F., http://sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=1067 (last visited Oct. 12, 2012); see 
also Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the 
Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1382–91 (2006) (discussing the sanctuary 
movement of the 1980s and the post-9/11 sanctuary resurgence). 
 9. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 10. Because the Court only addressed a facial challenge to Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070, and 
expressly reserved the possibility of future “as applied” challenges, see infra notes 197–201, 
continued litigation over S.B. 1070 is likely. See infra notes 246, 374–376 and accompanying 
text. 
 11. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 2010 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 113 (West) [hereinafter 
S.B. 1070]. 
 12. E.g., How the Supreme Court Ruled on SB 1070 and What It Means for Other States, 
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (July 25, 2012), http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/newsroom 
/release/how-supreme-court-ruled-sb-1070-and-what-it-means-other-states; John King, USA, 
CNN (June 25, 2012), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1206/25/jkusa.01.html (CNN 
commentator John King describing the Arizona decision as a “landmark decision”). 
 13. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2494–97. 
 14. S.B. 1070 § 3; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509(A) (2010) (discussed below, see infra 
Part II.C.1.a). 
 15. S.B. 1070 § 5(C); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C) (discussed below, see infra Part 
II.C.1.b). 
 16. S.B. 1070 § 2(E); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883(A)(5) (discussed below, see infra 
Part II.C.1.c). 
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held that these legislative efforts were preempted by comprehensive 
federal regulation of immigration enforcement.
17
 The Court 
additionally left open the possibility that the fourth challenged 
provision, requiring Arizona police officers to run immigration status 
checks on suspected immigration violators,
18
 might be held 




The failure of Arizona’s S.B. 1070, and the particular way it 
failed, has dramatically important consequences for the future of 
immigration enforcement. Arizona certainly tipped the balance in 
favor of federal enforcement and away from state and local 
enforcement. But this Article explores a less obvious consequence of 
Arizona: its implications for the continuing viability of a critical 
federal enforcement mechanism, the immigration detainer. 
An immigration detainer is a piece of paper issued by 
immigration officials that purports to command other law 
enforcement officials to hold a prisoner, who otherwise would be 
released, in custody and deliver that person to federal immigration 
officials.
20
 State and local officials regularly comply with 
immigration detainers by continuing to hold prisoners whom they 
would otherwise release.
21
 Federal enforcement programs like the 
highly controversial Secure Communities
22
 depend on the 
immigration detainer as their key enforcement mechanism. The 
Arizona decision saps the vitality out of this mechanism and exposes 
it as far exceeding any congressional grant of authority and as 





 17. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510. 
 18. S.B. 1070 § 2(B); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (discussed below, see infra Part 
II.C.1.d). 
 19. Because the Court permitted Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 to stand, the story of S.B. 1070 is 
not entirely over. 
 20. The federal immigration detainer is discussed more fully below. See infra Part III.A. 
 21. Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s Authority to Issue 
Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 173–74 (2008). Since I wrote in 2008, a 
wave of localities has begun to resist immigration detainers, as I discuss below. See infra notes 
41–42 and accompanying text. 
 22. This program is discussed below. See infra notes 262–273 and accompanying text. 
 23. This Article focuses only on the impact of Arizona upon the validity of the federal 
immigration detainer regulation. Discussion of the impact of Arizona on state and local 
enforcement of immigration detainers is outside the scope of this Article. But Arizona suggests 
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I begin in Part II with a discussion of the context in which S.B. 
1070 was passed, a brief history of the litigation over S.B. 1070, and 
the Arizona decision. The ongoing civil rights battle over 
immigration brought to the fore issues of racial profiling and the 
debate over whether states possess “inherent authority” to enforce 
immigration laws. Arizona failed to put these issues to rest, and the 
Court’s silence ensures ongoing controversy and litigation. Digesting 
the Arizona opinion, I address in turn (1) the majority’s preemption 
analysis (and its failure to address the civil rights issues) with respect 
to the four challenged provisions of S.B. 1070; (2) the Fourth 
Amendment discussion among the Justices, attendant to the question 
of whether state officials may subject suspected immigration 
violators to prolonged detention; and (3) the omission by the 
Justices—except for Justice Scalia—of any discussion of a state’s 
“inherent authority” or police power with respect to immigration 
enforcement. 
The remainder of the Article assesses the effect Arizona will 
have on the federal government’s use of immigration detainers to 
obtain custody over prisoners held by other law enforcement 
agencies. Ironically, while Arizona trumpets the supremacy of the 
federal government in the field of immigration, the opinion has 
negative implications for the federal government’s central 
enforcement mechanism for obtaining custody of suspected 
immigration violators. The legality of the immigration detainer 
system put in place by the executive branch can be analyzed through 
the same doctrinal frames seen in Arizona—preemption and the 
Fourth Amendment concerns with prolonged detention. 
I proceed to that analysis in Part III, addressing Arizona’s impact 
on federal authority to issue immigration detainers requiring other 
law enforcement officials to prolong the detention of their prisoners. 
I conclude that the detainer regulation purporting to allow this is 
ultra vires for the same reason the Arizona Court held parts of S.B. 
1070 preempted—the executive branch’s detainer regulation is flatly 
inconsistent with the comprehensive enforcement regime established 
 
that absent any federal authority for detaining suspected immigration violators, state and local 
officials may lack the authority to detain. Indeed, the states may lack any police power 
whatsoever regarding immigration, and alternatively, what police power the states do possess 
may have been preempted by comprehensive federal immigration control. 
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by Congress. Additionally, there are substantial Fourth Amendment 
problems with the immigration detainer regulation that Arizona’s 
Fourth Amendment discussion illuminates. The regulation is invalid 
because of these substantial constitutional questions.
24
 
II.  S.B. 1070 AND THE ARIZONA DECISION 
In this part, I briefly discuss the divergent solutions local 
communities adopted in response to perceived immigration crises 
since the 1990s and the criticism of the federal government’s 
enforcement programs by both pro- and anti-immigrant advocacy 
groups. I then discuss Arizona’s adoption of S.B. 1070 and 
“copycat” legislation passed elsewhere. Next, I summarize briefly 
the course of the litigation over S.B. 1070 and conclude with a 
discussion of the Supreme Court’s June 25, 2012, decision in 
Arizona v. United States. 
A.  Immigration and Immigration Detainers 
as Civil Rights Issues 
Recent disappointment with the federal government’s handling 
of immigration enforcement
25
 dates back at least to the 1980s,
26
 
when the government’s continued deportations of Guatemalan and 
Salvadoran refugees spawned the “sanctuary movement.” The 
“sanctuary movement” saw private and religious organizations come 
forward in opposition to federal policy to provide sanctuary to 
refugees.
27
 In turn, the movement spurred some localities to pass 
 
 24. As discussed briefly below, see infra Part III.C.2, although the Tenth Amendment was 
not discussed in the Arizona decision, there are substantial Tenth Amendment concerns raised by 
the detainer regulation. 
 25. State and local desire to outpace federal immigration enforcement is of course not a new 
phenomenon. E.g., Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and Local Anti-“Alien” 
Laws and Unity-Rebuilding Frames for Antidiscrimination Values, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 905, 
911–14 (2011) (discussing state and local legislation in 1870s and 1880s California aimed at 
repelling the “invasion of the subjects of the Mongolian empire”). Indeed, the Arizona Court 
relied extensively on Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), which arose after Pennsylvania 
enacted alien registration statutes that went further than their federal counterparts. 
 26. While I hope to provide useful examples to demonstrate the civil rights battle that has 
been ongoing in recent decades, a complete historical survey is far beyond the scope of this 
Article. For a recounting of the history I only briefly allude to here, see Gerald P. López, Don’t 
We Like Them Illegal?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1711, 1773–98 (2011). 
 27. Christopher Carlberg, Cooperative Noncooperation: A Proposal for an Effective 
Uniform Noncooperation Immigration Policy for Local Governments, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
740, 743–45 (2009). 
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legislation disentangling local from federal immigration policy. 
Ultimately, four states and twenty-three localities passed some form 
of sanctuary resolution or law in the 1980s.
28
 
An opposite prevailing sentiment was exemplified by the story 
of Proposition 187. In 1994 California voters responded to a 
plunging economy by focusing on undocumented immigrants from 
Mexico. Proposition 187 barred illegal immigrants from receiving 
government benefits and required California officials to report them 
to federal immigration officials.
29
 Proposition 187 was intended to 
“send a message” to a federal government Californians felt had failed 
adequately to address immigration.
30
 The rhetoric of the Proposition 
187 campaign was replete with anti-Mexican invective that raised 
obvious civil rights concerns.
31
 A federal court ultimately struck 
down the initiative as preempted.
32
 
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the federal government 
actively sought to enlist state and local cooperation in immigration 
enforcement. In 2002, a memorandum from the Department of 
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opined that “the authority to 
arrest for violation of federal law inheres in the States, subject only 
to preemption by federal law.”
33
 The “inherent authority” trumpeted 
by the 2002 OLC memo derived from the “States’ status as sovereign 
entities.”
34
 For state officers to arrest a person for a claimed violation 
of federal law (even civil immigration law) was, according to the 
logic of the 2002 OLC memo, an exercise of sovereign power akin to 
that exercised by Canadian Mounties arresting a fugitive from U.S. 
 
 28. Id.; Pham, supra note 8, at 1383. The federal government responded by enacting federal 
legislation prohibiting states and localities from preventing communication between their 
employees and federal immigration officials. Id. at 1384–85. 
 29. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 30. Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and 
California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. 
L. REV. 629, 633 (1995); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 786 (“The 
California voters’ overwhelming approval of Proposition 187 reflects their justifiable frustration 
with the federal government’s inability to enforce the immigration laws effectively.”). 
 31. Johnson, supra note 30, at 654–58, 660–61. 
 32. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 786. Kevin Johnson had accurately 
predicted that “a much-debated aspect of the passage of Proposition 187—that it is nativistic and 
racist—in all probability will never be decided by the courts.” Johnson, supra note 30, at 672. 
 33. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to John 
Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen. 1 (Apr. 3, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 OLC Memorandum], available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf. 
 34. Id. at 2. 
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justice.
35




Those on both sides of the immigration civil rights divide were 
entrenched on the issue of “inherent authority.” Critics believed state 
and local participation in enforcement would lead to racial profiling 
and would force immigrants into the shadows, discouraging 
immigrants from availing themselves of police and other social 
services.
37
 Some other concerns include perceived excesses of the 
federal antiterrorism effort
38
 and community outrage at immigration 
enforcement tactics and constitutional violations attendant to 
workplace and home raids.
39
 The result has been a resurgence of the 
sanctuary movement,
40
 on both the local level (where “sanctuary 
cities” like New Haven, Connecticut, and San Francisco, California, 
have enacted local ordinances that prohibit police from inquiring into 
immigration status)
41




 35. Id. at 3. 
 36. Id. 
 37. E.g., Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1085–88 (2004). For a more complete list of scholars who criticized the 
2002 OLC memo and the “inherent authority” argument, see López, supra note 26, at 1785 n.196. 
 38. See Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69 
BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1250–61 (2004). 
 39. See, e.g., Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional 
Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-
Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1126–40 (arguing constitutional violations attendant to 
immigration enforcement had become “both geographically widespread—ranging widely across 
geographical boundaries—and institutionally widespread—the result of behavior by law-
enforcement officers operating at the federal, state and local levels”); Bill Ong Hing, Institutional 
Racism, ICE Raids, and Immigration Reform, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 307 (2009) (discussing 
workplace raids). 
 40. Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representative of 
Good Policing and Good Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247, 306 (2012); Pham, supra note 8, at 
1387–91 (detailing post-9/11 “sanctuary” enactments). 
 41. See generally Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to 
Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1475–78 (2006) (exploring various rationales behind 
local sanctuary laws); Cristina Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration 
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 600–05 (2008) (discussing local sanctuary laws). Both New 
Haven and San Francisco have adopted municipal identification card programs that allow 
participation without regard for immigration status. Jeff Holtz, This Summer’s Surprise Hit: An 
Elm City ID, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, at O6; Jennifer Medina, New Haven Approves Program 
to Issue Illegal Immigrants IDs, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, at B6; Javier Erik Olvera, S.F. to Issue 
ID Cards to Illegal Immigrants: City Becomes Only the Second in Nation after New Haven, 
Conn., SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 21, 2007), http://www.mercurynews.com/politics 
/ci_7522078?nclick_check=1. 
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But not all post-9/11 measures have been aimed at reducing state 
and local involvement in immigration. Advocates of local 
enforcement, expressing dissatisfaction with the federal 
government’s failure to enforce immigration law more vigorously, 
succeeded in passing a host of local measures enlisting local officials 
in enforcement. Among the most notorious were those adopted in 
Hazleton, Pennsylvania; Escondido, California; Riverside, New 
Jersey; and Farmers Branch, Texas.
43
 These ordinances generally 
seek to prevent undocumented immigrants from obtaining 
employment or housing in a community, as well as to punish citizens 
for harboring the undocumented.
44
 On the statewide level, as will be 
discussed in detail below,
45
 Arizona led the way with S.B. 1070, 




Civil rights issues pervade not only the discussion about federal, 
state, and local enforcement but also the debate over federal 
immigration detainers. Detainers, discussed more fully below,
47
 are a 
mechanism for transferring the custody of state and local prisoners 
suspected of immigration violations to federal immigration 
authorities. In the last few years, compliance with immigration 
detainers has emerged as one litmus test for assessing where a 




No law enforcement agency of the State of Oregon or of any political subdivision of 
the state shall use agency moneys, equipment or personnel for the purpose of 
detecting or apprehending persons whose only violation of law is that they are 
persons of foreign citizenship present in the United States in violation of federal 
immigration laws. 
OR. REV. STAT. § 181.850(1) (2012). 
 43. Daniel Eduardo Guzmán, “There Be No Shelter Here”: Anti-Immigrant Housing 
Ordinances and Comprehensive Reform, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399, 405–13 (2010) 
(discussing these ordinances and the litigation challenging them). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See infra Part II.B. 
 46. See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of 
Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181–83 (2006); López, supra 
note 26, at 1811 (identifying Kobach as the “S.B. 1070’s architect”). 
 47. See infra Part III.A. 
 48. See Adam Sorensen, Obama’s Next Immigration Battle: Local, Federal Authorities on 
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Detainers implicate civil rights concerns in several ways. People 
arrested for minor offenses, including traffic violations, have become 
the targets of immigration detainers—in turn raising a concern that 
the detainer “tail” will wag the street-level enforcement “dog” and 
encourage racial profiling by police.
49
 Additionally, a lack of 
investigation and reliance on flawed databases has reportedly led to 
U.S. citizens being held pursuant to detainers.
50
 And numerous 
lawsuits have been brought alleging “overdetention” of prisoners 
based on immigration detainers.
51
 
Various “sanctuary” ordinances have been passed aiming to 
reduce compliance with detainers. As is discussed in further detail 




B.  The Passage of S.B. 1070 
and Ensuing Litigation 
At the state level, Arizona was determined to lead the way by 
enacting legislation that would engage state law enforcement fully in 
the immigration enforcement effort. In April 2010, Arizona’s 
 
 49. See Trevor Gardener II & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Effect: Racial Profiling in the ICE 
Criminal Alien Program, THE CHIEF JUST. EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY & 
DIVERSITY POLICY BRIEF, Sept. 2009, at 1, available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files 
/policybrief_irving_FINAL.pdf (observing correlation between issuance of detainers and profiling 
of Latinos in Irving, Texas). 
 50. See Molly F. Franck, Unlawful Arrests and Over-Detention of America’s Immigrants: 
What the Federal Government Can Do to Eliminate State and Local Abuse of Immigration 
Detainers, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 55, 65 (2011) (reporting 5 percent of individuals 
targeted for immigration enforcement through the “Secure Communities” program between 
October 2008 and October 2009 were U.S. citizens); Julia Preston, Immigration Crackdown Also 
Snares Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at A20. See also Henry v. Chertoff, 317 F. App’x 
178, 179 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing habeas petition alleging prisoner subject to immigration 
detainer was a U.S. citizen); Complaint, Vohra v. United States, No. SA CV 04-00972 DSF (RZ) 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2004) (alleging plaintiff was a U.S. citizen held pursuant to immigration 
detainer); Brian Bennett, Fingerprinting Program Ensnares U.S. Citizen; He’s Suing the FBI and 
Homeland Security After Being Flagged as an Illegal Immigrant and Held in Prison, L.A. TIMES, 
July 6, 2012, at A9 (describing U.S. citizen’s claim that he was wrongfully detained for two 
months due to database error). 
 51. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, QUICK INFORMATION ON IMMIGRATION DETAINERS 
(Mar. 2011), available at http://immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/2010 
/DetainersBackgrounder.pdf (detailing cases of overdetention); see also Franck, supra note 50, at 
79 (characterizing overdetention as not infrequent); Feds Pay $50k Settlement to ACLU Client, 
ACLU COLO. (May 3, 2011), http://aclu-co.org/news/feds-pay-50k-settlement-to-aclu-client 
(detailing a 47-day overdetention incident). 
 52. See infra notes 274–286 and accompanying text. 
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governor signed into law the now infamous S.B. 1070.
53
 The law 
essentially deputized Arizona police in the enforcement of federal 
immigration law. The intent of the legislation was overtly 
exclusionary: 
The legislature finds that there is a compelling 
interest in the cooperative enforcement of federal 
immigration laws throughout all of Arizona. The 
legislature declares that the intent of this act is to 
make attrition through enforcement the public policy 
of all state and local government agencies in Arizona. 
The provisions of this act are intended to work 
together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry 
and presence of aliens and economic activity by 
persons unlawfully present in the United States.
54
 
Among the provisions of S.B. 1070 were those ultimately 
challenged in Arizona v. United States: 
1) Section 2(B) requires Arizona officers who stop or detain a 
person to investigate immigration status “where reasonable 
suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully 
present in the United States.”
55
 Section 2(B) requires the 
officer to make a “reasonable attempt” to ascertain the 
person’s immigration status. If an arrest is made, the officer 
“shall have the person’s immigration status determined 
before the person is released.”
56
 
2) Section 3 makes “willful failure to complete or carry an 
alien registration document” in violation of federal law a 
state misdemeanor.
57
 The sentencing court may not suspend 
or probate the jail sentence imposed for this offense.
58
 
3) Section 5(C) makes it a state misdemeanor “for a person 
who is unlawfully present in the United States and who is an 
unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work 
 
 53. See ‘Show Your Papers’ Arizona Immigration Provision Survives As Court Rejects Bid 
to Have It Blocked, HUFFINGTON POST, (Sept. 25, 2012, 7:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2012/09/26/show-your-papers-arizona_n_1914678.html. 
 54. S.B. 1070 § 1, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
 55. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2011). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. § 13-1509. 
 58. Id. 
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in a public place or perform work as an employee or 
independent contractor in [Arizona].”
59
 
4) Section 6 authorizes Arizona police officers to make a 
warrantless arrest of any person “if the officer has probable 
cause to believe [the person] has committed any public 




After the passage of S.B. 1070, copycat legislation proliferated 
the following year,
61




Advocacy groups responded immediately to S.B. 1070’s 
enactment by filing five separate lawsuits in April and May 2010.
63
 
These lawsuits generally alleged that S.B. 1070 was motivated by 
racial bias and would result in racial profiling.
64
 Meanwhile, regular 
 
 59. Id. § 13-2928(C). 
 60. Id. § 13-3883(A)(5). 
 61. For a summary of legislative measures and how they fared, see National Copycat 
Landscape, MISS. IMMIGRANTS RIGHTS ALLIANCE (July 5, 2011), http://www.yourmira.org/ 
2011/07/05/national-copycat-landscape, and SB 1070 Copycats: Arizona-Related Legislative 
Developments, NAT’L COUNCIL LA RAZA, http://www.nclr.org/index.php/issues_and_programs 
/immigration/state_local_immigration_initiatives/arizona-related_legislative_developments/ (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2009) (indicating which states rejected or passed Arizona-copycat bills in the 
2010 and 2011 legislative session). 
 62. Robbie Brown, Georgia Gives Police Added Power to Seek Out Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A12 (describing Georgia’s new law as “one of the nation’s toughest 
immigration measures”); Richard Fausset, Alabama Enacts Strict Immigration Law, L.A. TIMES, 
June 10, 2011, at A8. 
 63. See Complaint, Friendly House v. Whiting, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (D. Ariz. 2012) (No. 
2:10-CV-01061-MEA), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/az_sb1070_complaint 
_20100517.pdf; Complaint, Escobar v. Brewer, No. 4:10-CV-00249-DCB (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 
2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/30717024/Escobar-v-Brewer; Complaint, Nat’l 
Coal. of Latino Clergy & Christian Leaders v. Arizona, No. 2:10-CV-00943 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 
2010), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/arizona/azdce/2: 
2010cv00943/519056/1/; Complaint, Salgado v. Brewer, No. 2:10-CV-00951-SRB (D. Ariz. 
Apr. 29, 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/34428984/Salgado-v-Brewer-A-Cop-s-
Lawsuit-Against-Arizona-s-New-Immigration-Law; Complaint, Frisancho v. Brewer, No. 2:10-
CV-00926-MEA (D. Ariz. Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites 
/default/files/docs/lac/Frisancho-v-Brewer-complaint.pdf. 
 64. See Complaint, Escobar, supra note 63, ¶ 31 (alleging S.B. 1070 compels Arizona police 
“to actively engage in racial profiling to detain, question and require every Hispanic found within 
the limits of the City of Tucson to prove their legal status in the United States”); id. ¶¶ 38–40 
(alleging S.B. 1070 “was enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona and signed into law 
by Defendant Brewer as a result of racial bias and anti-Hispanic beliefs and sentiments” and “is 
the product of racial bias aimed specifically at Hispanics”); see also Complaint, Salgado, supra 
note 63, ¶ 31 (alleging that S.B. 1070 will require the plaintiff, an Arizona police officer, “to use 
race as a primary factor in enforcing the various provisions of the Act”); Complaint, Frisancho, 
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and well-attended protests took place throughout the spring and 
summer.
65
 In June, the federal government expressed its 
disinclination toward Arizona’s brand of “cooperative enforcement 
of federal immigration laws” by suing to enjoin S.B. 1070, on 
preemption grounds, before it went into effect.
66
 On July 28, 2010, 
United States District Judge Susan Bolton granted the federal 
government’s request for a preliminary injunction against 
enforcement of the four provisions of S.B. 1070 detailed above.
67
 
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the 
United States argued that Arizona’s law would hamper federal 
immigration enforcement, impede U.S. foreign policy, and 
“prevent[] true cooperation by state and local officials with the 
 
supra note 63, ¶¶ 43–48 (alleging S.B. 1070 was adopted “because of, not merely in spite of, its 
adverse effect upon a discrete and insular minority—Hispanics”). 
 65. E.g., Parker Leavitt & Nathan Gonzalez, 2,500 Protest Law at State Capitol, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Apr. 26, 2010, at B1; Brady McCombs, Immigration Bill Prompts Protests in Tucson, 
Phoenix, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Apr. 20, 2010), http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border 
/article_7f8be9a8-4cb2-11df-906c-001cc4c002e0.html; Jim Nintzel, May Day Protest: 
Thousands Assemble Downtown To Protest SB 1070, TUCSON WEEKLY (May 2, 2010), 
http://www.tucsonweekly.com/TheRange/archives/2010/05/02/may-day-protest-thousands-
assemble-downtown-to-protest-sb-1070; Thousands in Phoenix Protest Against SB 1070, 
Thousands of SB 1070 Supporters Rally in Tempe, KVOA (May 30, 2010), http://www.kvoa.com 
/news/thousands-in-phoenix-protest-against-sb-1070-thousands-of-sb-1070-supporters-rally-in-
tempe/. 
 66. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff'd, 641 F.3d 339 
(9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (enjoining 
enforcement of most provisions of the bill). Federal judges in Georgia, Indiana, and Utah 
similarly granted preliminary injunctions blocking immigration legislation in those States. Ga. 
Latino Alliance For Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2011); Buquer v. 
City of Indianapolis, 797 F. Supp. 2 905 (S.D. Ind. 2011); Order Granting Temporary Restraining 
Order at 1, Utah Coal. of La Raza v. Herbert, No. 2:11-CV-401 CW (D. Utah filed May 11, 
2011), 2011 WL 7143098, at *1. A lawsuit was also filed in Alabama to block legislation there. 
Complaint at 1, Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley, No. 5:11-CV-02484-SLB, (N.D. Ala. 
filed July 8, 2011). 
 67. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 980. 
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federal officials responsible for enforcing federal law.”
68
 The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed Judge Bolton’s issuance of the injunction.
69
 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion struck a blow to the “inherent 
authority” argument that proponents of state and local enforcement 
had advanced in the wake of the 2002 OLC memorandum.
70
 The 
Ninth Circuit explicitly held that Arizona officers have no inherent 
authority to enforce federal civil immigration law.
71
 In so doing, the 
court issued a scathing rejection of the 2002 OLC memo, criticizing 
its logic and noting that the 2002 OLC memo (written during the 
administration of President George W. Bush) reached a conclusion 
opposite from the one the OLC had reached in 1996 (during the 
administration of President Clinton),
72
 which in turn was different 
from the conclusion the OLC had reached in 1989 (under President 
George H.W. Bush).
73
 This flip-flopping, the Ninth Circuit found, 
demonstrated why “[i]t is an axiomatic separation of powers 




Finding no “inherent authority” for states to enforce federal 
immigration laws, the Ninth Circuit looked unsuccessfully for 
evidence that the federal government had delegated to state officers 
the general authority to make civil immigration arrests as authorized 
in Section 6 of S.B. 1070.
75
 The court instead found that Section 6 
conflicted with the federal statutory structure, holding that federal 
law permitting state and local officials to arrest certain immigration 
 
 68. Brief for Appellee at 25–26, Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (No. 10-16645), 2010 WL 5162512, 
at *25–26. A coalition of cities and local governments argued Arizona’s laws, if permitted, would 
send a message that “will reverberate not just in Arizona but in every state across the country, 
making immigrants—whether they are naturalized citizens, lawful permanent residents, visa 
holders, or undocumented individuals—deeply distrustful of local governments and law 
enforcement officials” and “will have serious, long-term deleterious effects on the ability of local 
governments nationwide to protect the health and safety of all residents within their 
jurisdictions.” Brief of Amici Curiae the County of Santa Clara et al. at 2–3, Arizona, 641 F.3d 
339 (No. 10-16645), 2010 WL 5162525, at *2–3. 
 69. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 344. 
 70. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
 71. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 362. 
 72. The 1996 OLC memorandum found that state officers had no inherent authority to 
enforce federal immigration laws. 2002 OLC Memorandum, supra note 33, at 1–2, 5. 
 73. See id. at 7. 
 74. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 365 n.24. 
 75. Id. at 362. 
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violators
76
 preempted the portion of S.B. 1070 that broadly permitted 




While the Ninth Circuit’s express rejection of the “inherent 
authority” argument was limited to Section 6 of S.B. 1070, the court 
also found that other sections of S.B. 1070 sought to legislate in 
areas where states have not traditionally legislated.
78
 Section 2(B), 
which required state officers to identify immigration violators, was 
not legislation in an area of traditional state concern.
79
 Similarly, 
punishing unauthorized immigrants for their failure to comply with 
federal registration laws, under Section 3 of S.B. 1070, was not held 
to be within the state’s traditionally exercised power.
80
 
The Ninth Circuit did uphold Arizona’s authority in one 
instance. With respect to Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070, which made it a 
state crime for an unauthorized immigrant to seek employment, the 
court noted that “the power to regulate the employment of 
unauthorized aliens remains within the states’ historic police 
powers.”
81
 The court relied for this proposition on its opinion in 
Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano,
82
 which in turn relied on 
the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in DeCanas v. Bica,
83
 where the 
Ninth Circuit held that “the authority to regulate the employment of 
unauthorized workers is ‘within the mainstream’ of the state’s police 
powers.”
84
 The Ninth Circuit in Chicanos Por La Causa rejected the 
suggestion that the holding of DeCanas had been weakened by the 
 
 76. 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (2006) (permitting state and local officers, “to the extent permitted by 
relevant State and local law,” to arrest and detain an alien illegally present who “has previously 
been convicted of a felony in the United States and deported or left the United States after such 
conviction, but only after the State or local law enforcement officials obtain appropriate 
confirmation from the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the status of such individual.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 77. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 361–66. 
 78. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 348 (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009)) 
(explaining that had “Congress . . . legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally 
occupied,” a presumption against federal preemption would have applied). 
 79. Id. at 348. 
 80. Id. at 355. 
 81. Id. at 357. 
 82. 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 83. 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
 84. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc., 558 F.3d at 864 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356, 365). 
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subsequent passage of extensive federal legislation governing the 
employment of unauthorized immigrants.
85
 
After the Ninth Circuit’s Arizona decision, Chicanos Por La 
Causa made its way to the Supreme Court. Under the name of 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting,
86
 the Court 
held that another Arizona law concerning immigrants, which 
imposed licensing restrictions on businesses employing 
undocumented workers and required businesses to use the federal 
“E-Verify” system, was not preempted by federal control over 
immigration.
87
 As the Ninth Circuit had done previously in Chicanos 
Por La Causa and Arizona, the Court noted (relying on DeCanas) 
that state regulation of immigrants’ employment is within a field of 
legislation traditionally occupied by the states.
88
 
The stage was now set for the United States Supreme Court to 
decide the fate of S.B. 1070. It was a case that some might have 
believed promised resolution of important questions of civil rights 
and inherent state authority concerning immigration,
89
 but no 
resolution would be forthcoming. 
C.  The Decision in 
Arizona v. United States
90
 
In a 5–3 decision,
91
 the Court struck down three of the four 
provisions of S.B. 1070 that were at issue.
92
 The Court did so on 
 
 85. Id. at 864–65. 
 86. 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
 87. Id. at 1974. “[P]rohibit[ing] the knowing employment . . . of persons not entitled to 
lawful residence in the United States, let alone to work here, is certainly within the mainstream of 
[the State’s] police power.” Id. (quoting DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 356); see also DeCanas, 424 U.S. 
at 356 (“States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment 
relationship to protect workers within the State.”). See generally Marisa S. Cianciarulo, The 
“Arizonification” of Immigration Law: Implications of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting for 
State and Local Immigration Legislation, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 85, 89 (2012) (predicting the 
Supreme Court would affirm the Ninth Circuit’s ruling striking down S.B. 1070 despite the 
Court’s holding in Whiting that Arizona was not preempted in its efforts to regulate the 
employment of unauthorized aliens). 
 88. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1973–75. 
 89. But see Johnson, supra note 3, at 629–32 (suggesting the “civil rights implications for 
communities of color” would remain unaddressed due to the procedural posture of the case). 
 90. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 91. The majority opinion was authored by Justice Kennedy, and joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg. Justice Kagan took no part in the 
decision, having recused herself presumably because of her work for the Obama administration as 
solicitor general. Justices Scalia and Thomas filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in 
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preemption grounds.
93
 The single provision left intact—Section 2(B), 
colloquially known as the “show me your papers”
94
 or “papers, 
please”
95
 provision—was held not preempted, but only because the 
Court found the provision could conceivably be implemented in a 
manner consistent with federal law.
96
 The Court reserved for the 
future the possibility that the law as implemented would be subject to 
a preemption or other constitutional challenge.
97
 Much of the Court’s 
discussion concerned potential Fourth Amendment problems that 
may attend the implementation of the provision.
98
 
The Court’s opinion is notable for its struthious avoidance of 
two issues that might have been expected to dominate the discussion: 
“inherent authority” and civil rights. Expected to be a major factor in 
the Court’s decision, the “inherent authority” of state and local law 
enforcement officers to enforce immigration laws was prominently 
absent from the opinions, except in Justice Scalia’s bilious dissent, 
which broadly asserted the police power of the states to engage in 
immigration enforcement.
99
 Similarly, the civil rights issue that had 
long been at the core of the debate over S.B. 1070—racial 
profiling—was generally missing, briefly mentioned only in Justice 




part—both Justices would have upheld S.B. 1070 in its entirety. Id. at 2511–22 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2522–24 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in 
which he agreed that the majority correctly struck down Section 3 as preempted, and expressed 
his view that the remaining sections of S.B. 1070 were unobjectionable. Id. at 2524–25 (Alito, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 92. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503, 2505, 2507 (holding sections 3, 5(C), and 6 preempted). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Bill Keller, Show Me Your Papers, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2012, at A15. Section 2(B) 
requires Arizona officers to make reasonable attempts to ascertain the immigration status of those 
stopped, detained, or arrested. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2011). 
 95. See Peter Spiro, SB 1070 Argument Recap: “Papers, Please” Likely to Stick, Other 
Provisions Not So Clear, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 25, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/04/25/sb-
1070-argument-recap-papers-please-likely-to-stick-other-provisions-not-so-clear/ (using “papers, 
please” but cautioning that the label is “not entirely accurate, insofar as [under S.B. 1070] an 
officer first requires some other reason to stop, detain, or arrest an individual—suspected 
undocumented status by itself isn’t enough to initiate the process”). 
 96. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509–10. 
 97. Id. at 2510. 
 98. Id. at 2527–29 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 99. See id. at 2518 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 100. See id. at 2529 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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How the case was presented provides one possible explanation 
for the lack of attention to racial profiling. Various groups had sued 
to enjoin S.B. 1070 on the basis that it violated equal protection 
guarantees because it was “enacted with the purpose and intent to 
discriminate against racial and national origin minorities, including 
Latinos, on the basis of race and national origin” and would cause 
“widespread racial profiling and will subject many persons of 
color . . . to unlawful interrogations, searches, seizures and 
arrests.”
101
 But only the case filed by the United States, which relied 
on preemption and not profiling, was taken up by the Supreme 
Court.
102
 Nonetheless, several of the amicus briefs raised the 
profiling issue, giving the Court the opportunity to do so as well
103
—
an opportunity the Court rebuffed. 
1.  The Court’s Preemption Analysis 
In addressing the four provisions of S.B. 1070 at stake, the Court 
employed both “field preemption” and “obstacle preemption” 
analysis. 
 
 101. Andrea Christina Nill, Latinos and S.B. 1070: Demonization, Dehumanization, and 
Disenfranchisement, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 35, 49–52 (2011) (quoting Complaint, Friendly 
House v. Whiting, No. CV10-1061, at 6 (D. Ariz. dismissed Sept. 16, 2010)). 
 102. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 631–32 (suggesting the preemption arguments are “easier 
for the U.S. government to prevail upon than rights-based claims, while also avoiding the charge 
that the Administration is playing the proverbial ‘race card’”); see also Johnson, supra note 30, at 
673 (observing, in discussing California’s Proposition 187, that there are “many explanations why 
courts will avoid even asking, much less deciding, whether race, color, and ethnicity 
impermissibly motivated” state anti-immigrant legislation). Gerald P. López juxtaposes the fact 
that the Obama administration had proved indifferent to claims of racial profiling in its “Secure 
Communities” immigration enforcement initiative with a description of how the administration 
“[s]idestepp[ed] substantial evidence of racial profiling and anti-immigrant hysteria [and] relied 
upon traditionally influential preemption arguments” in its attack on S.B. 1070. López, supra note 
26, at 1804–05. 
 103. E.g., Brief of Argentina et al. at 28–35, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), 
2012 WL 1114006, at *28–35; Brief of Amici Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice et 
al. at 21–23, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), WL 1044364, at *21–23; Brief of 
Former Arizona Attorneys General Terry Goddard and Grant Woods et al. at 14–20, Arizona, 132 
S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 1044358, at *14–20. The brief for the United States 
also alluded to civil rights issues pertaining to Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070—making it a crime for 
an unauthorized alien to seek employment. In describing Congress’s statutory scheme governing 
unauthorized employment—which the United States described as a “comprehensive scheme 
prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the United States” that “leaves no room for the 
imposition of state criminal liability on individual aliens”—the United States noted the “civil 
rights” provisions of the statutory scheme, which prohibit discrimination against job applicants on 
the basis of national origin or citizenship. Brief for United States at 34–37 & n.22, Arizona, 132 
S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 939048, at *34–37 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324b). 
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Field preemption, the Court explained, can occur in two ways. 
Congress may indicate its intent to displace state law entirely by 
implementing a “framework of regulation ‘so pervasive . . . that 
Congress [leaves] no room for the States to supplement it.’”
104
 
Alternatively, field preemption occurs where there is a “federal 
interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to 
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”
105
 
“Obstacle preemption” involves a detailed comparison of the 
state and federal statutes to determine whether state and federal law 
conflict. Obstacle preemption occurs “where the challenged state law 
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”
106
 
a.  Section 3—criminalizing noncompliance 
with federal registration laws—held subject to field preemption 
First, the Court struck down Section 3 of S.B. 1070. Section 3 
created a new state misdemeanor for failing to obey federal laws 
requiring the carrying of an “alien registration document.”
107
 The 
Court rejected the “mirror” theory of preemption advocated by 
Arizona and its supporters,
108
 which holds that so long as state laws 
punish only what is punishable under corresponding federal laws 
there can be no preemption because there is no conflict between the 
state and federal laws.
109
 The Court held the “comprehensive” 





 104. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 
(1947); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000)). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Margaret M. Stock, Online Symposium: The Court Throws Arizona a Tough Bone to 
Chew, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=147811 (“For legal 
scholars, the most critical point is that the Supreme Court rejected the “mirror image” theory of 
preemption, which had been put forth by Kris Kobach, who was Mitt Romney’s immigration 
advisor during the Republican primary campaign. The “mirror image” theory—which argues that 
state immigration laws are constitutional if they “mirror” federal laws—was soundly rejected by 
five Justices of the Supreme Court, including Chief Justice John Roberts.”). 
 109. See id. 
 110. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502. 
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Six Justices agreed that Section 3 was subject to field 
preemption, with Justice Alito joining the five-member majority 
opinion.
111
 These six Justices grounded their holding in the Court’s 
1941 decision in Hines v. Davidowitz.
112
 A brief discussion of Hines 
is in order. 
In Hines, the Court held Pennsylvania’s alien registration 
system, adopted in 1939, had been preempted by Congress’s 1940 
enactment of a comprehensive registration system, the Alien 
Registration Act.
113
 Both the Pennsylvania and federal enactments 
required aliens to register and notify authorities of any change in 
address.
114
 In addition, the Pennsylvania law required an alien over 
eighteen years old to 
receive an alien identification card and carry it at all times; 
show the card whenever it may be demanded by any police 
officer or any agent of the Department of Labor and 
Industry; and exhibit the card as a condition precedent to 
registering a motor vehicle in his name or obtaining a 
license to operate one.
115
 
The Court’s opinion in Hines engaged two entwined narratives, 
and partly because of these two distinct narratives, Hines can be read 
as an instance either of field preemption or of obstacle preemption. 
The first narrative is one of the federal government’s plenary power 
over foreign affairs, and its more sweeping language suggests a field 
preemption analysis. Laws imposing burdens upon aliens, wrote the 
Hines majority, cannot be considered purely local exercises of state 
police power.
116
 “[E]ven though [such laws] may be immediately 
associated with the accomplishment of a local purpose, they provoke 
questions in the field of international affairs.”
117
 That field being “the 
one aspect of our government that from the first has been most 
generally conceded imperatively to demand broad national 
 
 111. Id. at 2524–25 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Scalia and 
Thomas dissented, and would have upheld Section 3 against the preemption challenge. Id. at 2511 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 2522 (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 112. 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
 113. Id. at 72–74. 
 114. Alien Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 673–76 (1940). 
 115. Hines, 312 U.S. at 59. 
 116. See id. at 66. 
 117. Id. 
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authority,” wrote the Court, “[a]ny concurrent state power that may 
exist is restricted to the narrowest of limits.”
118
 It was not difficult 
for the Court to reach the conclusion that there is no “equal and 
continuously existing concurrent power of state and nation” when it 
comes to immigration, and that Pennsylvania’s law must, by virtue of 
the Supremacy Clause, yield.
119
 
The second narrative in Hines emphasized alien registration as a 
civil liberties issue. The Court suggested that civil liberties factored 
into the preemption analysis as much as the foreign affairs concern 
did, finding it “also of importance that this legislation deals with the 
rights, liberties, and personal freedoms of human beings.”
120
 
The Hines Court began its discussion of the civil liberties issue 
by noting the hostility historically attendant to any suggestion that an 
alien be required to carry some form of registration on his or her 
person.
121
 The Court quoted opposition to an 1892 registration law 
that compared the requirement to measures implemented for convicts 
and for slaves: 
[The Chinese covered by the Act] are here ticket-of-leave 
men. Precisely as, under the Australian law, a convict is 
allowed to go at large upon a ticket-of-leave, these people 
are to be allowed to go at large and earn their livelihood, 
but they must have their tickets-of-leave in their 
possession . . . . This inaugurates in our system of 
government a new departure; one, I believe never before 
practiced, although it was suggested in conference that 
some such rules had been adopted in slavery times to secure 
the peace of society.
122
 
According to this narrative, Congress’s decision to omit any 
requirement that an alien carry registration from the Alien 
Registration Act of 1940 was a deliberate act intended to preserve 
 
 118. Id. at 68. 
 119. Id.; see also id. at 66 & n.17 (“[T]he regulation of aliens is so intimately blended and 
intertwined with responsibilities of the national government that where it acts, and the state also 
acts on the same subject, ‘the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, 
though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.’”). 
 120. Id. at 67–68. 
 121. Id. at 68. 
 122. Id. at 71 (alterations in the original). 
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valued civil liberties. Congress “tr[ied] to steer a middle path” by 
enacting a registration requirement but 
in such a way as to protect the personal liberties of law-
abiding aliens through one uniform national registration 
system, and to leave them free from the possibility of 
inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that might not 
only affect our international relations but might also 




The Hines opinion thus cast the federal government into the role 
of protector/enforcer not just with respect to foreign affairs but also 
with respect to civil liberties. The Court’s analysis with respect to the 
civil liberties issue in Hines focused on a specific difference between 




The way the Arizona majority treats Hines is interesting because 
of its characterization of Hines as a field preemption case and its 
preference for the foreign affairs narrative over the civil rights 
narrative.
125
 The Court’s citations in support of reading Hines as a 
field preemption case speak to the ascendance of the national interest 
and remoteness of the states’ interests in matters touching on foreign 
affairs.
126
 This analysis is hard to confine to the discrete area of alien 
 
 123. Id. at 73–74. A decade after Hines, Congress enacted a statute requiring every alien 
eighteen years of age or older to “at all times carry with him and have in his personal possession” 
his registration certificate or card. Willful violation of this statute was punishable by a fine of 
$100, imprisonment not to exceed thirty days, or both. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 
ch. 477, 66 Stat. 224 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1304 (1996)). The registration carrying 
requirement did not appear to spark controversy in 1952. See Developments in the Law 
Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REV. 643, 679–80 (1953). More recently, following 
9/11, the federal government again initiated controversial registration rules. The civil rights 
implications were noted this time. See Wishnie, supra note 37, at 1102–03 (noting racial profiling 
concerns raised by the federal government’s attempt to enlist state and local law enforcement 
officials to police the NSEERS program). 
 124. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 69–74. 
 125. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012); see also id. at 2529 (Alito, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Although there is some ambiguity in Hines, the 
Court largely spoke in the language of field pre-emption.”). 
 126. One opinion cited by the Arizona majority characterized Hines as a field preemption case 
in these terms: 
If a State were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious 
claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility, field preemption might be 
the appropriate doctrine, whether the National Government had acted and, if it had, 
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registration, as opposed to immigration more generally. Indeed the 
emphasis on the importance of the nation speaking with one voice on 
immigration echoes throughout the Court’s opinion.
127
 
On the other hand, the Arizona Court’s preference for the 
foreign affairs narrative nearly completely obscured the civil rights 
aspect of Hines.
128
 The Court missed a clear opportunity, for Section 
3 of S.B. 1070, like the Pennsylvania statute at issue in Hines, could 
be characterized as a state’s effort to outpace federal immigration 
enforcement during times of perceived crisis. In Hines, the state 
sought to add a provision that required immigrants to carry their 
registration—a provision deliberately left out of the federal 
legislation.
129
 In Arizona, the state added a “no probation” provision 
to the state-law registration crime it created to parallel the federal 
crime.
130
 This, along with the possibility that Arizona would enforce 
its registration crime more zealously than the federal government 
 
without reference to the degree of any conflict, the principle having been established 
that the Constitution entrusts foreign policy exclusively to the National Government. 
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 419 n.11 (2003) (citing Hines 312 U.S. at 63); Arizona, 
132 S. Ct. at 2502 (citing Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.11). See also Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 
350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) 
(characterizing Hines as a case in which state regulation “touch[ed] a field in which the federal 
interest is so dominant that the federal system (must) be assumed to preclude enforcement of state 
laws on the same subject”); Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 
2098–99, 2107 (2000) (arguing that “Hines may be better understood as a field preemption case 
because the opinion relied on the uniquely national nature of regulating aliens to hold that state 
laws on the same subject are displaced”). 
 127. E.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498 (“The Government of the United States has broad, 
undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens. . . . It is fundamental 
that foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the 
United States must be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one national 
sovereign, not the 50 separate States.” (citations omitted)); id. at 2506–07 (“A decision on 
removability requires a determination whether it is appropriate to allow a foreign national to 
continue living in the United States. Decisions of this nature touch on foreign relations and must 
be made with one voice.”). 
 128. The Court noted that in Hines, “The new federal law struck a careful balance. It punished 
an alien's willful failure to register but did not require aliens to carry identification cards.” Id. at 
2501. But the Court’s inclusion of these facts hardly paints Hines as a case involving civil 
liberties—these details are supplied to demonstrate that Congress made deliberate choices in 
crafting a “single integrated and all-embracing system.” Id. (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 74). 
Justice Alito did note the Court’s conclusion in Hines that Congress’s intent was “to protect the 
personal liberties of law-abiding aliens through one uniform national registration system.” Id. at 
2529–30 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Hines 312 U.S. at 74). This 
was not much more than a passing comment, however. No effort was made to link the civil rights 
tone of Hines to current civil rights issues. 
 129. Hines, 312 U.S. at 59–60. 
 130. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503. 
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would enforce its own registration crime, was noted by the Court as a 
way in which Arizona’s scheme conflicted with Congress’s.
131
 But 
whereas the Hines Court saw the conflict created by Pennsylvania’s 
anti-immigrant law as implicating the federal government’s role as 
protector of civil liberties, the Arizona Court tepidly noted that the 
conflicts “simply underscore the reason for field preemption.”
132
 
Rather than focusing on the civil rights concern presented by the 
state’s attempt to outpace federal enforcement, the Arizona Court 
consistently returned the conversation to the potential interference 
with the federal government’s power over foreign affairs.
133
 
The avoidance of a civil rights narrative was consistent with the 
Arizona opinion as a whole. The Court, throughout its opinion, 
declined to reach the civil rights issues that many saw as being at the 
heart of the case, preferring instead a relatively sanitized preemption 
analysis focusing on “fields” and “obstacles.”
134
 Given the centrality 
of civil rights issues to the debate over the role of state and local 
governments in immigration enforcement and the presence of civil 
rights concerns as a basis for the Hines Court’s holding, the absence 
of any discussion of these issues in Arizona was glaring. 
b.  Section 5(C)—criminalizing 
the unauthorized seeking of work— 
held subject to obstacle preemption 
Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070 creates a state criminal prohibition on 




Just as the Arizona Court used Hines to show that it was not 
drawing on a blank slate with regard to state criminal laws 
concerning alien registration, the Court used precedent to color its 
analysis for Section 5(C)’s regulation of the employment of 
undocumented immigrants. In its 1976 decision in DeCanas v. 
 
 131. Id. at 2502–03. 
 132. Id. at 2503. 
 133. Id. at 2497–98 (“The Federal Government’s broad, undoubted power over immigration 
and alien status rests . . . on its inherent sovereign power to control and conduct foreign 
relations . . . .”). 
 134. Id. at 2501. 
 135. Id. at 2503. 
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Bica,
136
 the Court upheld a California law imposing sanctions on 
those who “knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to lawful 
residence in the United States if such employment would have an 
adverse effect on lawful resident workers.”
137
 The Court rejected the 
conclusion of the California Court of Appeal that the statute was 
subject to field preemption.
138
 
While affirming the notion that the “[p]ower to regulate 
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power,” the 
DeCanas Court cautioned that not every state law dealing with 
immigrants is preempted as a “regulation of immigration.”
139
 The 
Court characterized California’s law as within the state’s “broad 
authority under [its] police powers to regulate the employment 
relationship to protect workers within the State” and as “focuse[d] 
directly upon . . . essentially local problems.”
140
 Congress, on the 
other hand, had shown no more than a “peripheral” interest in 
regulating the employment of the undocumented.
141
 And that subject 
matter was not necessarily encompassed within the broad framework 
of “immigration”
142
: “The comprehensiveness of the INA scheme for 
regulation of immigration and naturalization, without more, cannot 
be said to draw in the employment of illegal aliens . . . .”
143
 Thus 
DeCanas permitted state laws in service of protecting state workers 
to stand, given Congress’s apparent lack of activity with respect to 
undocumented workers. 
The Arizona majority was quick to point out, however, that the 
“peripheral” interest of Congress in employment of the 
 
 136. 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
 137. Id. at 352–53. 
 138. The court of appeal held that “in the area of immigration and naturalization, 
congressional power is exclusive,” and construed Congress’s failure to include employer 
sanctions in the INA as a deliberate and intentional aspect of its comprehensive scheme 
governing immigration. Id. at 353–54 (citing DeCanas v. Bica, 40 Cal. App. 3d 976, 979 (1974)). 
 139. Id. at 354–55. 
 140. Id. at 356–57. 
 141. Id. at 360. 
 142. Id. at 360 n.8 (“Little aid can be derived from the vague and illusory but often repeated 
formula that Congress ‘by occupying the field’ has excluded from it all state legislation. Every 
Act of Congress occupies some field, but we must know the boundaries of that field before we 
can say that it has precluded a state from the exercise of any power reserved to it by the 
Constitution. To discover the boundaries we look to the federal statute itself, read in the light of 
its constitutional setting and its legislative history.” (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 
78–79 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting))). 
 143. Id. at 359. 
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undocumented had attained central significance in 1986, when 
Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
(“IRCA”). IRCA, described by the Court as “a comprehensive 
framework for ‘combating the employment of illegal aliens,’”
144
 
imposes criminal and civil penalties on employers of unauthorized 
workers, and civil (but not criminal) penalties on the workers 
themselves.
145
 Given this complete scheme, the Court found that 
“Congress made a deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties 
on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment.”
146
 
Given the Court’s description of IRCA as providing a 
“comprehensive framework” concerning employment of undocument
ed workers, and given the connection between this subject and the 
foreign affairs power, it is something of a mystery that the Court did 
not hold that Section 5(C) was, like Section 3, subject to field 
preemption.
147
 This is especially so given that the Court’s obstacle 
preemption analysis tracks essentially the same conflict the Court 
observed with respect to Section 3. “[C]onflict is imminent whenever 
two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity,”
148
 
wrote the Court in reference to the unavailability of probation as a 
possible sentence for alien registration crimes under Section 3 of 
S.B. 1070 despite its availability for the same crimes under federal 
law. Similarly, even though the Court determined Section 5(C) was 
an “attempt to achieve one of the same goals as federal law—the 
deterrence of unlawful employment”—it nonetheless conflicted with 




 144. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2504 (2012) (quoting Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002)). 
 145. Id. IRCA does impose criminal penalties on unauthorized workers who obtain 
employment by fraud. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. The United States argued that Section 5(C) was subject to field preemption and 
alternatively subject to obstacle preemption. Brief for the United States at 36, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 
2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 939048 at *20 (arguing that IRCA “leaves no room for the 
imposition of state criminal liability on individual aliens”); Id. at 39 (arguing that “[e]ven if IRCA 
left room for supplemental state measures” Section 5 “conflict[s] with the careful balance 
Congress struck [in IRCA]”); Oral Argument at 71, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-
182), 2012 WL 1425227, at *71 (“[W]e're making both a field and a conflict preemption 
argument here . . . .”). 
 148. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503 (quoting Wisconsin Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human 
Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986)). 
 149. Id. at 2505. 
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Yet whereas the Court found that this enforcement conflict “simply 
underscore[d] the reason for field preemption” of Section 3, the 
Court eschewed field preemption and relied exclusively on the 




While the Court reached opposite results using a similar analysis 
on Sections 3 and 5(C), the Court was consistent in its avoidance of 
any discussion of the civil rights implications of both sections. Just 
as the Court failed in its discussion of Section 3 even to note the civil 
rights concerns raised by alien registration provisions, and the 
possibility of their enforcement by anti-immigrant local authorities, 
the Court turned a blind eye to the civil rights implications of 
employer and employee sanctions in its discussion of Section 5(C). 
The Court did give a nod to the humanitarian concerns that prompted 
Congress to adopt principally employer sanctions in IRCA, noting 
that Congress’s judgment not to punish unauthorized workers was in 
part because they “already face[d] the possibility of employer 
exploitation because of their removable status.”
151
 But the Court 
ignored entirely the civil rights concerns raised by the federal 
government in its brief. 
Prior to IRCA, federal law provided no penalty for an employer 
of unauthorized workers.
152
 During the process of appraising 
employer sanctions, Congress considered argument and testimony 
that employer sanctions would lead to employer discrimination 
against job applicants perceived to be foreign.
153
 As a result, IRCA 
 
 150. Some possible reasons the Court did not embrace a field preemption theory with respect 
to Section 5 are as follows: the Court attempted to temper its holding of field preemption with 
respect to Section 3, and preserve some area in which the states can legislate; the Court gave 
some deference to the DeCanas precedent; the Court was inhibited from pursuing field 
preemption due to the presence of an express preemption provision which explicitly permits some 
state involvement in the field of employment regulation, see, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. 
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977–81 (2011) (holding Arizona law, providing for suspension or 
revocation of various licenses of an employer of unauthorized workers, was within the saving 
clause of IRCA’s express preemption provision); and the Court was reluctant to embrace the field 
preemption argument of the United States given that the United States failed to argue field 
preemption in Whiting, see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (No. 09-115), 2010 WL 3501180 (arguing only express and obstacle 
preemption). 
 151. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504. 
 152. See id. at 2519–20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 153. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(I), at 68 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5672; 
Darcy M. Pottle, Federal Employer Sanctions as Immigration Federalism, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
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contained antidiscrimination provisions “because of the concern . . . 
that people of ‘foreign’ appearance might be made more vulnerable 
by the imposition of sanctions . . . [and] that some employers may 
decide not to hire ‘foreign’ appearing individuals to avoid 
sanctions.”
154
 IRCA’s antidiscrimination provisions made it unlawful 
to engage in employment discrimination on the basis of national 
origin or citizenship status, required the President to appoint a 
“Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment 
Practices” to investigate and bring complaints, and provided for 
hearings before administrative judges to be assigned by the attorney 
general.
155
 IRCA also required the General Accounting Office to 
conduct three annual studies to determine whether widespread 
discrimination was occurring as a result of employer sanctions.
156
 
The antidiscrimination provisions of IRCA were augmented in 
1990
157
 and again in 1996.
158
 
In its brief, the United States referred to these antidiscrimination 
provisions in describing Congress’s “comprehensive federal scheme 
governing the employment of aliens.”
159
 The United States argued 
that Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070, which criminalizes an unauthorized 
worker’s mere act of applying for or soliciting work, conflicted with 
Congress’s antidiscrimination laws that forbid any pre-hiring inquiry 
into a worker’s employment authorization in order to prevent 
 
99, 136–37 (2010); see generally Steven M. Kaplan, The Employer Sanctions Provision of IRCA: 
Deterrence or Discrimination?, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 545, 549–50 (1992) (concluding that IRCA 
resulted in widespread discrimination); Sarah M. Kendall, America’s Minorities Are Shown the 
“Back Door” . . . Again: The Discriminatory Impact of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 
18 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 899, 904–06 (1996) (indicating a pattern of widespread discrimination 
against persons perceived as alien as a direct result of IRCA’s implementation). 
 154. H.R. REP. NO. 99-1000, at 87 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5840, 5842. 
 155. Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 102(a), 100 Stat. 3374, 3375–76. 
 156. Id. § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3369–70. 
 157. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 531, 104 Stat. 5054; see Kaplan, supra 
note 153, at 550–52. 
 158. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 404(d)(4)(B), 110 Stat. 3009-664 (8 U.S.C. § 1324a note), cited in Brief for the 
United States at 41, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 
939048, at *41. 
 159. Brief for the United States at 34, 37 n.22, 40–41, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 
11-182), 2012 WL 939048 at *34, *37 n.22, *40–41. 
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discrimination in hiring.
160
 Yet the Arizona Court did not note these 
or any other civil rights concerns with Section 5(C).
161
 Instead, the 
Court merely found that Arizona’s employee sanctions conflicted 
with Congress’s deliberate omission of criminal employee sanctions 
from its comprehensive scheme. 
Just as the Court in its discussion of Section 3 avoided readily 
available avenues for engaging the civil rights narrative, so did it 
remain reticent even though similar opportunities were presented to 
the Court with respect to Section 5(C). The Court completely ignored 
Congress’s concern for civil liberties when it crafted its 
comprehensive statutory scheme governing unauthorized 
employment. But congressional concern for protecting civil liberties 
was not irrelevant in Hines and should not have been in Arizona 
either. Here again the Court missed the forest for the fields and 
obstacles. 
 
 160. Id. at 40–41. While the congressional scheme was aimed at preventing discrimination, 
there is strong evidence that the anti-discrimination provisions were not effective. See Kaplan, 
supra note 153, at 554–55 (1992) (concluding the IRCA employer sanctions caused “widespread” 
discrimination); Kendall, supra note 153. 
 161. There are, of course, other arguments not made by the United States that Section 5(C) 
would result in civil rights violations. While “applying for work” may occur in a private place, 
Section 5(C) also makes it a crime for an unauthorized worker to “solicit work in a public place 
or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in this state.” Enforcement of these 
criminal provisions raises racial profiling, selective enforcement, and First Amendment concerns, 
particularly for day laborers. See Kristina M. Campbell, The High Cost of Free Speech: Anti-
Solicitation Ordinances, Day Laborers, and the Impact of “Backdoor” Local Immigration 
Regulations, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 1 (2010) (“While many day laborers are lawfully present or 
have authorization to work in the United States, some people assume day laborers to be ‘illegal 
aliens’ due to the high-profile nature of their job search—which usually involves waiting on 
corners in front of ‘big-box’ stores or in nearby labor centers for a potential employer to offer 
them work . . . . As such, day laborers are a visible and vulnerable population, subject to 
discriminatory treatment on the basis of real or perceived immigration status on a daily basis.”); 
id. at 3–22 (analyzing cases addressing day laborers’ First Amendment right to solicit 
employment); Id. at 26–30 (discussing racial profiling of day laborers); Wishnie, supra note 37, 
at 1104 (“Even before the September 11 attacks, INS regularly engaged in racial profiling and 
selective enforcement based on ethnic appearance. . . . [Especially in] worksite raids, federal 
agents [continue to] single out worksites . . . based on the presence of ‘Spanish music’ or workers 
of ‘Hispanic appearance,’ and target individual Latinos—from amidst ethnically diverse 
workforces—for questioning, arrest, and prosecution.”). 
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c.  Section 6—permitting Arizona officers 
to effect civil immigration arrests— 
held subject to obstacle preemption 
Section 6 of S.B. 1070 purported to expand state arrest power to 
include arrests based on “probable cause to believe [a person] has 
committed any public offense that makes [him or her] removable 
from the United States.”
162
 
Five Justices agreed Section 6 was subject to “obstacle” 
preemption.
163
 At its core, the question presented by Section 6 was 
whether state officials can make civil immigration arrests.
164
 
The majority first focused on the statutory structure that 
Congress put in place for the arrest of suspected civil immigration 
violators.
165
 Three threads run through this analysis of Congress’s 
statutory structure. First, Congress has directed with specificity the 
narrow circumstances under which immigration arrests may occur.
166
 
Second, Congress has expressed through its legislative enactments a 
concern for the competence of nonfederal officials to enforce federal 
immigration law.
167
 Third, the statutory structure of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act reflects a determination that immigration 
enforcement requires the Nation to speak “with one voice”—the 
voice of the federal government.
168
 
The majority first noted that Congress’s “statutory structure 
instructs when it is appropriate to arrest an alien during the removal 
process.”
169
 Congressional enactments limit the arrest power of 
immigration officials to two circumstances.
170
 First, immigration 
officials may execute administrative arrest warrants issued at the 
discretion of the attorney general.
171
 Second, immigration officials 
 
 162. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883(A)(5) (2011). 
 163. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497, 2507. 
 164. Id. at 2498. 
 165. Id. at 2505–07. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 2507 (citing Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348 
(2005)). 
 169. Id. at 2505. 
 170. Id. at 2505–06. 
 171. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006)). The administrative arrest warrants authorized by 
INA § 236 are not the equivalent of criminal arrest warrants. The statute sets forth no standard for 
the issuance of such warrants. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, 
an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed 
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may make warrantless arrests for civil immigration violations, but 




Contrasting Section 6 of S.B. 1070 with the statutory structure 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Court found Arizona’s 
statute to be in conflict. “Section 6 attempts to provide state officers 
even greater authority to arrest aliens on the basis of possible 
removability than Congress has given to trained federal immigration 
officers,” the majority wrote, noting that Section 6 imported neither 
the warrant requirement nor the likelihood of flight requirement for 
warrantless arrests.
173




The Court next observed that Congress’s statutory structure 
carved a specific niche for state law enforcement out of its overall 
immigration enforcement scheme. Most notably, Congress allowed 
for formal agreements—known as 287(g) agreements because of 
their statutory source
175
—between the executive branch and state or 
local law-enforcement agencies, effectively deputizing those 
agencies’ officers to enforce federal immigration law.
176
 Here the 
 
from the United States.”). There is no requirement that such warrants be based upon sworn 
testimony, or issued by a neutral magistrate. See El Badrawi v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 2d 
204, 230 & n.17 (D. Conn. 2011) (granting summary judgment on false arrest claim to plaintiff 
who had been subject of administrative warrant); El Badrawi v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 579 F. 
Supp. 2d 249, 275–76 (D. Conn. 2008) (treating arrest pursuant to administrative warrant as 
warrantless arrest under Connecticut tort law and federal constitutional law for purposes of false 
arrest claim). 
 172. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2006)). The Court did not 
explicitly note the other important requirement of § 1357—that an immigration official making a 
warrantless arrest have “reason to believe” the arrestee has violated federal immigration law. 
Courts have construed the “reason to believe” requirement as importing a probable cause 
requirement in order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
seizures. Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication 
of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1608 & n.229 (2010). 
 173. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506. 
 174. Id. In its discussion, the Court noted that immigration officials executing warrants are 
required to have “received training in the enforcement of immigration law.” Id. Section 6 of 
course did not include this requirement, and also did not require consultation between state and 
federal officials. The majority expressed concern that Section 6 allowed state officers to make 
immigration arrests “without any input from the Federal Government about whether an arrest is 
warranted in a particular case. This would allow [Arizona] to achieve its own immigration 
policy.” Id. 
 175. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 287(g), 66 Stat. 233 (1952) (codified as amended 8 
U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006)). 
 176. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506. 
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Court paid special attention to the competency concerns evident in 
Congress’s statutory structure, noting that 287(g) agreements not 
only require nonfederal officers to be adequately trained to carry out 
immigration duties, but also mandate that those officers be subject to 
the federal government’s “direction and supervision.”
177
 
After noting the need for immigration decisions to be “vested 
solely in the Federal Government,”
178
 the Court discussed a statutory 
provision relied on by Arizona permitting state and local law 
enforcement to “cooperate with the Attorney General in the 
identification, apprehension, detention or removal” of immigration 
violators.
179
 No “coherent” understanding of this provision, wrote the 
Court, would encompass the “unilateral decision of state officers to 
arrest an alien for being removable absent any request, approval, or 
other instruction from the Federal Government.”
180
 The Court 
endorsed examples of “cooperation” such as a joint state-federal task 
force or the provision by state officers of “operational support in 
executing a warrant.”
181
 Section 6, vesting broad unilateral arrest 
authority in Arizona officials, could not be justified as state-federal 
“cooperation” as envisioned by Congress and delineated in its 
statutory structure. 
Here again the Court’s opinion dodged the civil rights 
implications of the debate. Following the passage of S.B. 1070, 
commentators assailed the statute, and Section 6 in particular, as 
likely to promote racial profiling in Arizona.
182
 But the Court paid no 
 
 177. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(g)(2)–(3)). 
 178. Id. at 2507. 
 179. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10). 
 180. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507. 
 181. Id. In discussing what might constitute “cooperation” under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10), the 
majority explicitly mentioned immigration detainers. The Court’s citation to immigration 
detainers as an example of state officers assisting federal immigration officials is discussed 
below. See infra notes 339–343 and accompanying text. 
 182. E.g., Kristina M. Campbell, The Road to S.B. 1070: How Arizona Became Ground Zero 
for the Immigrants' Rights Movement and the Continuing Struggle for Latino Civil Rights in 
America, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 2 (2011); Robert F. Castro, Xenomorph!! Indians, 
Latina/os, and the Alien Morphology of Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 
3–4 (2011); Andrea Christina Nill, Latinos and S.B. 1070: Demonization, Dehumanization, and 
Disenfranchisement, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 35, 49 (2011). 
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attention to the issue, despite it being presented in several of the 
amicus briefs filed in the Arizona case.
183
 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented from the Court’s 
decision striking down Section 6. Each believed that local arrests 
were justifiable as “cooperation” with the federal government.
184
 
d.  Section 2(B)—“Show Me Your Papers” 
—held not facially preempted 
Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 requires Arizona officers to make 
reasonable attempts to ascertain the immigration status of those 
stopped, detained, or arrested, and in the case of arrested persons, 
requires immigration status to be determined before release of the 
arrestee.
185
 The Court held Section 2(B) not facially preempted. 
The Court’s discussion of Section 2(B) began by noting some 
“limits” to the requirements of Section 2(B), two of which involved 
civil rights. The first “limit” forbids Arizona officers from 
considering “race, color or national origin,” except to the extent 
permitted by the United States or Arizona Constitutions.
186
 The 
second “limit” directs Arizona officers to implement S.B. 1070 so as 
to “protect[] the civil rights of all persons and respect[] the privileges 




 183. E.g., Brief of Argentina, et al. at 28–35, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182); Brief of 
Amici Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice et al., at 21–23, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 
(No. 11-182); Brief of Former Arizona Attorneys General Terry Goddard and Grant Woods, et al. 
at 14–20, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182). In part, this was due to the strategy of the 
United States. The United States omitted racial profiling from its brief and disclaimed the issue at 
oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, 45, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182). 
Nonetheless, Solicitor General Verrilli brought in the profiling argument through a discussion of 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), and the concern the Hines Court had for “harassment.” 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 45–47, Hines, 312 U.S. 52 (No. 22). Of course, as we have seen, 
the Court overlooked the civil rights aspects of Hines. See supra notes 129–132 and 
accompanying text. 
 184. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2525 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 
2512 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2522 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). The dissenters offered additional reasons for their disagreement as to 
Section 6. For Justice Scalia, whose dissent will be discussed in greater detail below, see infra 
Part II.C.3, the “most important point is that . . . Arizona is entitled to have ‘its own immigration 
policy’—including a more rigorous enforcement policy—so long as that does not conflict with 
federal law.” Id. at 2516–17 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 185. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2010). 
 186. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508 (majority opinion) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-
1051(B)). 
 187. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(L)). 
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The reference to the “limits” of S.B. 1070 was as far as the 
Arizona Court went in addressing the civil rights concerns raised by 
S.B. 1070 and its opponents.
188
 The Court did not engage in a 
discussion of racial profiling but instead merely quoted the supposed 
safeguards embedded in S.B. 1070—safeguards amounting to 
nothing more than a directive to Arizona officers to follow the 
United States and Arizona Constitutions.
189
 That the Court quoted 
these arguably empty safeguards
190
 in its discussion of the only 
provision of S.B. 1070 it upheld against constitutional challenge 
signaled the Court’s overall lack of concern for the civil rights issues 
presented in this case.
191
 
The Court upheld Section 2(B) principally because it viewed the 
statutory provision as requiring nothing more than communication 
between state and federal officials.
192
 “Consultation between federal 
and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system,” 
the Court wrote, and then catalogued statutes it believed indicated 
Congress’s encouragement of state reporting of suspected 
immigration violators.
193
 Despite the argument of the United States 
that Section 2(B) might interfere with the executive branch’s 
enforcement priorities,
194
 the Court held that the statutory scheme 
 
 188. Id. at 2507–08. 
 189. Id. at 2508. 
 190. See, e.g., Jennifer R. Phillips, Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and Federal Preemption of State and 
Local Immigration Laws: A Case for a More Cooperative and Streamlined Approach to Judicial 
Review of Subnational Immigration Laws, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 955, 996 (2012) (arguing that 
section 11-1051(L) “amounts to mere rhetoric that does little to effectively combat the dangers of 
racial profiling and enforcement of the law based on arbitrary judgments of race and national 
origin”); David A. Selden, Julie A. Pace & Heidi Nunn-Gilman, Placing S.B. 1070 and Racial 
Profiling into Context, and What S.B. 1070 Reveals About the Legislative Process in Arizona, 43 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 523, 525–43 (2011) (tracing the history of the provision of S.B. 1070 relating to 
racial profiling, noting its roots in segregationist rhetoric, and arguing the “anti-racial profiling” 
provision is “deliberately murky”). 
 191. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507–10. 
 192. Id. at 2508. 
 193. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(A) (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1644). 
 194. Id.; Brief for the United States at 16, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 
939048, at *13 (“By insisting indiscriminately on enforcement in all cases, and requiring state 
and local officers (whenever practicable) to verify the immigration status of everyone they stop or 
arrest if there is reasonable suspicion that the person is unlawfully present, Section 2 forbids 
officers—on pain of civil penalties—from looking to the lead of federal officials and adhering to 
the enforcement judgments and discretion of the federal Executive Branch.”). 
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The Court next addressed the argument that Section 2(B) might 
result in the prolonged detention of persons “for no reason other than 
to verify their immigration status.”
196
 The majority acknowledged 
this would be a constitutional “concern.”
197
 But, applying a 
narrowing construction, the Court held that Section 2(B) “could be 
read to avoid these concerns.”
198
 If Section 2(B) “only requires state 
officers to conduct a status check during the course of an authorized, 
lawful detention or after a detainee has been released,” the Court 
wrote, it would survive preemption, because of the Court’s prior 
conclusion that the communication required by Section 2(B) was not 
inconsistent with the statutory structure of the INA.
199
 
The Court thus upheld a narrowly construed Section 2(B), 
holding the status check requirement valid, provided that it does not 




 195. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508. 
 196. Id. at 2509. 
 197. Id. The Fourth Amendment issue raised by prolonged detention is discussed below. See 
infra Part III.C.1. 
 198. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509. 
 199. Id. Because it avoided the prolonged detention issue, the Court explicitly acknowledged 
that its opinion “does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as 
interpreted and applied after it goes into effect.” Id. at 2510 (emphasis added). 
 200. One possibility raised by this holding is that state officials would seek to ground 
prolonged detention in reasonable suspicion that a detainee has committed a federal immigration 
crime. This in turn raises the question of whether state officials have the authority to enforce 
criminal immigration laws. Here as elsewhere, the Court’s opinion as to “inherent authority” was 
ambiguous, leaving the issue undecided: “There is no need in this case to address whether 
reasonable suspicion of illegal entry or another immigration crime would be a legitimate basis for 
prolonging a detention, or whether this too would be preempted by federal law.” Id. at 2509 
(citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948); Gonzales v. Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475–
76 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds in Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 
(9th Cir. 1999)). 
There is no way to know whether with this sentence the Court left two questions 
unanswered or one question with two alternative answers. By its citations to two cases suggesting 
the authority of state officers to arrest for federal crimes, Di Re and Gonzales, one might 
reasonably imply the only question remaining open is whether states’ inherent authority to 
prolong detention based on reasonable suspicion of a federal immigration crime has been 
preempted by Congress. But another possible reading is that the Arizona majority leaves open the 
antecedent question of whether the states actually possess any inherent authority to enforce 
federal immigration crimes. 
These questions, however, including the question of the correct reading of this sentence 
from the majority opinion, are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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2.  Fourth Amendment Concerns 
with Prolonged Detention to 
Investigate Immigration Status 
Much of the Court’s opinion with respect to Section 2(B), which 
was held not preempted, was devoted to the possible Fourth 
Amendment issues attendant to Arizona’s “show me your papers” 
law. The implications of that discussion will be far reaching.
201
 
As noted above, the possibility presented by Section 2(B)—that 
state officers would subject individuals to prolonged detention “for 
no reason other than to verify their immigration status”
202
—was not 
sufficiently demonstrated by the record for the majority to conclude 
that prolonged detention would in fact occur and would constitute an 
obstacle to Congress’s immigration enforcement scheme. The 
majority was quick to note, however, that “[d]etaining individuals 
solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional 
concerns.”
203
 The cases cited indicate that the Fourth Amendment 
was the source of these “constitutional concerns.”
204
 And the 
majority’s suggestion that Arizona could avoid such concerns by not 
prolonging detention to pursue the immigration status verification 
required by Section 2(B), as well as the concluding note that the 
Arizona decision “does not foreclose other preemption and 
constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied,”
205
 
reveals the depth of the majority’s concern that prolonged detention 
would violate the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 201. See supra Section II.C.1.d. 
 202. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509. 
 203. Id. (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 
405, 407 (2005)). 
 204. The portion of Arizona v. Johnson presumably referenced by the majority states: 
A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a 
traffic violation. The temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily 
continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop. Normally, the stop 
ends when the police have no further need to control the scene, and inform the driver 
and passengers they are free to leave. An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to 
the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the 
encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do 
not measurably extend the duration of the stop. 
Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333 (citations omitted). The majority likewise quoted Caballes for the 
proposition that “[a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the 
driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete 
that mission.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. 
 205. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510. 
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Of the dissenters, Justices Alito and Scalia both recognized that 
prolonged detention would raise Fourth Amendment concerns,
206
 
with Justice Alito addressing the issue by means of an extended 
hypothetical. Justice Alito’s opinion supposes that a police officer, 
during a traffic stop for a speeding violation, “acquires reasonable 
suspicion to believe that the driver entered the country illegally”—a 
federal crime.
207
 While acknowledging that absent the acquisition of 
reasonable suspicion, the traffic stop might “become unlawful if . . . 
prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that 
mission,” Justice Alito opined that the officer’s acquisition of 
reasonable suspicion “that [the driver] committed a different crime” 
would justify extending the detention “for a reasonable time to verify 
or dispel that suspicion.”
208
 The “length and nature” of this 
additional investigation must remain reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, Justice Alito cautioned, for “[a]n investigative stop, if 
prolonged, can become an arrest and thus require probable cause.”
209
 
Given his conclusion that state officers could, consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment, reasonably prolong detention upon acquiring 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause of criminal immigration 
violations,
210
 Justice Alito concluded that “[i]f properly 
implemented, § 2(B) should not lead to federal constitutional 
violations, but there is no denying that enforcement of § 2(B) will 
multiply the occasions on which sensitive Fourth Amendment issues 
 
 206. Justice Scalia, while dismissing the Fourth Amendment discussion as dicta “hav[ing] 
nothing to do with this case,” nonetheless acknowledged that “[o]f course, any investigatory 
detention, including one under § 2(B), may become an ‘unreasonable . . . seizur[e],’ if it lasts too 
long.” Id. at 2516 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV) (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407). Justice Thomas did not address the Fourth 
Amendment issue in his discussion of Section 2(B). See id. at 2522–23 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 207. Id. at 2528 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) 
(2006)). 
 208. Id. at 2528–29 (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407; Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 
(2005)). 
 209. Id. at 2529 (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407). Justice Alito noted that moving the 
suspect from the site of the traffic stop, or “forcibly remov[ing] a person from his home or other 
place in which he is entitled to be and transport[ing] him to the police station” would transform 
the investigative stop into an arrest, requiring probable cause. Id. (quoting Hayes v. Florida, 470 
U.S. 811, 816 (1985)). 
 210. This conclusion, of course, depends on whether state officers have authority to detain 
suspects for federal crimes—a threshold question Justice Alito acknowledged and answered in the 
affirmative. See id. 
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will crop up.”
211
 To avoid such occasions, Justice Alito 
recommended that both the federal and state governments issue 
guidance to officers, and that officers be provided with a 
“nonexclusive list containing forms of identification sufficient . . . to 
dispel any suspicion of unlawful presence.”
212
 
3.  Justice Scalia’s Inherent Authority Argument 
During the litigation over Arizona’s S.B. 1070, discussed above, 
the Ninth Circuit addressed whether permitting State officers to 
effect warrantless arrests based on probable cause for a civil 
immigration violation was preempted by federal law. The first step in 
the court’s inquiry was determining whether “arresting immigrants 
for civil immigration violations” is “a field which the states have 
traditionally occupied.”
213
 The court found it was not
214
 and went on 
to hold explicitly that states have no inherent authority to enforce the 
civil provisions of federal immigration law.
215
 By contrast, the Tenth 
Circuit had upheld an arrest by local police based solely on 
immigration status, holding that federal immigration law did not 
preempt any “preexisting state or local authority to arrest individuals 
violating federal immigration laws.”
216
 
“Inherent authority,” then, was expected to be a major part of 
the Court’s decision. Yet, despite the issue having been fairly joined 
in the parties’ briefing,
217
 the majority opinion barely touched the 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. See id. Here, Justice Alito appears to have conflated “unlawful presence” with criminal 
activity. Cf. id. at 2505 (majority opinion) (“As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable 
alien to remain present in the United States. If the police stop someone based on nothing more 
than possible removability, the usual predicate for an arrest is absent.”) (citing INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984)). 
 213. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 348 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 214. Id. at 361. 
 215. Id. at 362. The court emphasized the federal statutes which authorize state and local 
officers to enforce immigration laws and found that Congress had permitted limited state and 
local involvement but preempted the remainder of the field. Id. at 361–66. 
 216. United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999). It does not 
appear that the issue of whether such local arrests exceeded Oklahoma’s police power was 
raised—indeed, the only issue addressed in the opinion is whether Federal law preempted State 
authority. Id. 
 217. Arizona argued throughout that state officers have inherent authority to enforce both 
criminal and civil immigration laws. In response, the United States argued that “Arizona has no 
inherent power to impose criminal punishment for violation of a duty owed to the federal 
government” and that whatever inherent authority the states have with respect to immigration is 
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issue. The majority opinion did say that “[t]he problems posed to 
[Arizona] by illegal immigration must not be underestimated.”
218
 Yet 
the majority opinion scrupulously avoided any reference to inherent 
authority and never referred to Arizona as a sovereign 
government.
219




Justice Scalia’s dissent began and ended with the proposition 
that each state, as an independent sovereign, has its own “inherent 
power to exclude persons from its territory, subject only to those 
limitations expressed in the Constitution or constitutionally imposed 
by Congress.”
221
 The opinion caused immediate outrage among 
commentators who seized upon this passage from Justice Scalia’s 
dissent: 
Notwithstanding “[t]he myth of an era of unrestricted 
immigration” in the first 100 years of the Republic, the 
States enacted numerous laws restricting the immigration of 
certain classes of aliens, including convicted criminals, 
 
limited to cooperation with federal enforcement. Brief for the United States at 27–31, 55 n.33, 
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 939048, at *17–18, *29. At oral argument, Paul 
Clement (arguing for Arizona) never uttered the phrase “inherent authority,” or even “police 
power.” Solicitor General Verrilli, true to the brief for the United States, argued that Section three 
was preempted in part because “there is no state police power interest in that Federal registration 
relationship.” Oral Argument at 58, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182). 
 218. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500. 
 219. Cf. id. at 2498 (finding federal government’s authority to control immigration stems in 
part from its “inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations”). 
The majority opinion only referred to state “police power” in a general way at the outset of its 
preemption analysis, id. at 2501, and one other time when citing its precedent in De Canas v. 
Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), as recognizing that “States possess broad authority under their police 
powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State.” Arizona, 132 
S. Ct. at 2501, 2503. The latter reference, of course, was a far cry from a declaration that states 
have inherent authority to enforce federal immigration laws. 
While the majority opinion failed to address “inherent authority” directly, it seems at least 
true to say the Arizona majority did not share the vision of inherent authority expressed in the 
2002 OLC memorandum, of the states as sovereign entities akin to foreign nations. After all, the 
United States is not capable of “preempting” the police power of Canada. The Arizona majority, 
however, had no difficulty concluding that whatever authority Arizona has over civil immigration 
violations is subordinate to federal authority in that realm and must not conflict with or pose an 
obstacle to federal authority. The Arizona opinion did not go so far, however, as the Ninth Circuit 
had when it explicitly rejected the notion that Arizona possessed any inherent authority to enforce 
civil immigration laws. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 362 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 220. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2511 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 221. Id. 
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indigents, persons with contagious diseases, and (in 
Southern States) freed blacks. State laws not only provided 
for the removal of unwanted immigrants but also imposed 




But Justice Scalia’s reliance on slavery-era precedent did not 
stop with a single reference to southern states excluding free African 
Americans. His dissent was rife with “authorities” tracing whatever 
validity they once had to the institution of slavery.
223
 Justice Scalia 
began with, ended with, and entirely depended upon a vision of the 
Constitution that is, quite simply, the proslavery Constitution of the 
antebellum Republic. The crux of the problem is that the authorities 
relied upon by Justice Scalia cannot be disentangled from their 
proslavery roots; they cannot be said to support an “immigration” 
power in the states, since their purpose was partly to broker and 
perpetuate the compromise between the slaveholding and free states 
in the first century of the Nation’s existence. 
Justice Scalia first held the power to control immigration arises 
as an inherent aspect of state sovereignty: “[The] power to exclude 
has long been recognized as inherent in sovereignty.”
224
 Justice 
Scalia then pointed to several provisions of the Constitution he 
argued were put in place to protect this sovereign “immigration” 
power of the states.
225
 For example, Justice Scalia cited the 
 
 222. Id. at 2512 (citing Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration (1776–1875), 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1835, 1841–80 (1993)); see also Ian Millhiser, Justice Scalia Cites Pro-
Slavery Laws Excluding ‘Freed Blacks’ To Justify His Anti-Immigrant Opinion, THINKPROGRESS 
(June 26, 2012), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/06/26/506191/justice-scalia-cites-pro-
slavery-laws-excluding-freed-blacks-to-justify-his-anti-immigrant-opinion/ (criticizing the cited 
passage in Justice Scalia’s dissent); Adam Serwer, Scalia Cites Slavery-Era Laws in Immigration 
Dissent, MOTHER JONES (June 25, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/06/ 
immigration-law-dissent-scalia-reference-slavery-era-laws (describing the cited passage in Justice 
Scalia’s dissent as one that “stood out from the rest”); Jeffrey Toobin, That’s Just Nino: Scalia’s 
Arizona Dissent, NEW YORKER (June 26, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs 
/comment/2012/06/antonin-scalia-dissent-immigration-arizona.html (noting that the cited 
passage’s “invocation of that ugly chapter in American history suggests at a minimum, a loss of 
perspective”). “Harkening back to the ‘good old days’ of the law of slavery impeaches his 
position,” commented Professor Gabriel Chin. Ethan Bronner, A Dissent by Scalia Is Criticized as 
Political, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/us/scalias-
immigration-dissent-is-criticized-as-political.html. 
 223. Cf. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2511–22 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 224. Id. at 2511. 
 225. Id. at 2511–12. 
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Privileges and Immunities Clause
226
 as promoting the power of the 
states to exclude.
227
 Whereas under the Articles of Confederation all 
“inhabitants” of the states enjoyed the privileges and immunities of 
the “free citizens in the several States,” under the Constitution the 
privileges and immunities were reserved for citizens of the states.
228
 
Of course, the reality is that this state “immigration” power was used 
to regulate the African American population in the states. State 
citizenship was unavailable to African Americans in the slave states 
and ultimately, after Dred Scott,
229
 even to free African Americans in 
the free states.
230
 The “immigration” power embodied in the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause was required, after the Civil War, 
to be undone with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which established a national citizenship 
to which African Americans were granted access, and placed in the 
national government the responsibility to protect the privileges and 
immunities pertaining to that national citizenship.
231
 
Justice Scalia also cited the Export Clause of the Constitution
232
 
as “an acknowledgment of the States’ sovereign interest in protecting 
their borders.”
233
 “[T]he States could exclude . . . dangerous or 
unwholesome goods,” he wrote.
234
 But the importance of the Export 
Clause was not in this power—for which the relationship to 
immigration is uncertain and not clarified by Justice Scalia—but in 
its identity as one provision among many in the great compromise 




 226. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 227. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2511–12 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 228. Id. at 2512. 
 229. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 230. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, 
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 36 (1996). 
 231. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN A RACIST SOCIETY 1886–1883 101–10 (Harold Hyman & Stuart 
Bruchey eds., 1987); Alexander Tsesis, Self-Government and the Declaration of Independence, 
97 CORNELL L. REV. 693, 729 n.178 (2012). 
 232. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay 
any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for 
executing it's inspection Laws.”). 
 233. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See Erik M. Jensen, The Export Clause, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 3 (2003) (arguing that 
“[w]ithout the protection the Export Clause provided to exporting states, particularly in the South, 
the Constitutional Convention would have imploded.”); id. at 10–14 (detailing the connection 
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Perhaps most appalling of all was Justice Scalia’s reference to 
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution. In this provision, Justice 
Scalia found acknowledgment of an immigration power in both the 
federal government and the states (subject to federal restriction): 
“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States 
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by 
the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and 
eight . . . .”
236
 Justice Scalia did not refer to this constitutional 
provision by its common appellation and did not discuss the 
importance of this clause—the Slave Trade Clause—in brokering the 
constitutional compromise between slaveholding and free states.
237
 
After setting forth his general argument that the immigration 
power is inherent in state sovereignty, resting upon the historical 
authorities discussed above, Justice Scalia considered the four 
sections of S.B. 1070 in turn, finding each provision to be a 
legitimate exercise of Arizona’s sovereign “power to exclude” not 
preempted by federal legislation.
238
 
Justice Scalia concluded with a vitriolic diatribe against the 
federal immigration enforcement effort. The last decade saw an 
“increasing tide of illegal border crossings into Arizona,” which 
Justice Scalia suggested was the result of “unwise” targeting of funds 
for immigration enforcement.
239
 Justice Scalia then railed against the 
Obama administration’s recently announced plan to grant deferred 
action to so-called “Dreamers”—noncitizens brought to the United 
States before they turned sixteen who qualify for the program by 
demonstrating, inter alia, participation in school or employment and 
 
between slavery and the opposition of southern states in the Constitutional Convention to export 
taxes); see also Raymond T. Diamond, No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall’s Thesis on the 
Intent of a Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 VAND. L. REV. 93, 121–22 (1989) (discussing the Export 
Clause in terms of the North-South slavery compromise, while noting that Southern delegates 
were concerned that exports produced by slave states would be taxed as a means of “in effect 
tax[ing] slavery”); id. at 126 (arguing the “Framers of the Constitution . . . actively protected 
Southern interests in slavery by their adoption of the 1808 clause, the fugitive slave clause, and 
the export tax clauses, and . . . intended to protect slavery passively through the three-fifths 
clause”). 
 236. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 237. See PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 
22–26 (1981). 
 238. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2511–22 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 239. Id. at 2520–21. 
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the absence of a criminal record
240
—questioning President Obama’s 
statement that it was “the right thing to do.”
241
 
“[T]here has come to pass, and is with us today,” Justice Scalia 
concluded, 
the specter that Arizona and the States that support it 
predicted: A Federal Government that does not want to 
enforce the immigration laws as written, and leaves the 
States’ borders unprotected against immigrants whom those 
laws would exclude. So the issue is a stark one. Are the 
sovereign States at the mercy of the Federal Executive’s 
refusal to enforce the Nation’s immigration laws?
242
 
Justice Scalia’s final rhetorical question brought the argument 
full circle. “Would the States conceivably have entered into the 
Union if the Constitution itself contained the Court’s holding?”
243
 
The answer to this question may well be “no.” But that may owe less 
to the Framers’ insistence on reserving an immigration power to the 
states than to the constitutional compromises that were brokered 
between the states on the issue of slavery.
244
 
III.  THE LESSON OF ARIZONA: 
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH LACKS THE POWER 
TO ISSUE IMMIGRATION DETAINERS 
What consequences will the Arizona decision have for the future 
of immigration enforcement? One might assume Arizona will signal 
 
 240. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Announces Deferred 
Action Process for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement Priorities (June 15, 2012), 
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/15/secretary-napolitano-announces-deferred-action-process-
young-people-who-are-low. 
 241. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The 
remarks criticizing President Obama drew vast media attention. E.g., Ethan Bronner, A Dissent by 
Scalia is Criticized as Political, NY TIMES, June 28, 2012 at A18; Jonathan Easley, Justice Scalia 
Rips Obama’s Deportation Directive in Dissent on Arizona Case, HILL (June 25, 2012, 
12:49PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/234571-justice-scalia-blasts-obamas 
-deportation-directive. One columnist called for Justice Scalia to “free himself to pursue his true 
vocation” (politics) by resigning. E.J. Dionne, Jr., Scalia Must Resign, WASH. POST (June 27, 
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ej-dionne-jr-justice-scalia-should-resign/2012 
/06/27/gJQApkO06V_story.html. 
 242. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 243. Id. at 2522. 
 244. See generally FINKELMAN, supra note 237, at 22–34 (noting that the issue of slavery 
affected decisions on representation, taxation, commercial regulation, domestic tranquility, state 
sovereignty, and interstate relations). 
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the withdrawal of the states from immigration enforcement, though 
the Court’s reliance on obstacle rather than field preemption may 
send states back to the drawing board in an attempt to craft un-
preempted immigration laws.
245
 But Arizona’s effects are not limited 
to state efforts at immigration enforcement. In the rest of this Article, 
I consider the implications of Arizona for one key federal 
enforcement mechanism—the immigration detainer. 
This part demonstrates that the executive branch lacks the power 
it has asserted in its immigration detainer regulation. I first briefly 
discuss the importance of detainers to the federal immigration 
enforcement effort.
246
 The United States issues approximately 
250,000 immigration detainers each year,
247
 and detainers are 
perhaps the single key enforcement mechanism driving the record 
numbers of deportations seen in recent years. 
I then demonstrate that the Arizona Court’s analysis of S.B. 
1070 shows that the immigration detainer system currently in use is 
invalid for two reasons. 
First, Arizona held that Section 6 of S.B. 1070 was preempted 
because it authorized state officers to make immigration arrests 
under circumstances where federal immigration officers were not so 
empowered by Congress.
248
 Section 6, held the Court, was 
inconsistent with “the system Congress created.”
249
 The detainer 
regulation put in place by the executive branch suffers from that 
 
 245. Kevin Johnson, for example, has written, 
the Supreme Court has cracked open the door to new state legislation, new claims of 
racial discrimination, and new lawsuits. States are likely to test the boundaries of 
Arizona v. United States with new, if not improved, immigration enforcement 
legislation. Litigation over the constitutionality of the laws is likely to continue. The 
lasting solution to the proliferation of state immigration enforcement laws, which is 
beyond the power of the Supreme Court, is for Congress to enact comprehensive 
immigration reform that has the support of the public. Perhaps the publicity over 
Arizona v. United States will prod Congress to act. Until it does, we can expect the 
status quo to continue. 
Kevin Johnson, The Debate over Immigration Reform Is Not Over Until It’s Over, SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 25, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/online-symposium-the-debate-over-
immigration-reform-is-not-over-until-its-over/. 
 246. See infra Part II.A. 
 247. In fiscal year 2009, ICE’s Criminal Alien Program issued 234,939 detainers nationwide, 
or approximately 20,000 per month. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY11 BUDGET IN BRIEF 63, 
available at http://www.deportationnation.org/library/. 
 248. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507. 
 249. Id. at 2506. 
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same defect—it requires state officers to make immigration arrests in 
circumstances well beyond the limited arrest authority Congress 
granted to federal immigration officers. Because it exceeds the 
“system Congress created,” the regulation is ultra vires.
250
 
Second, while the Court upheld Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070, it did 
so by finding Section 2(B) to govern only communication. The Court 
explicitly noted that prolonged detention to investigate immigration 
status would raise constitutional concerns. Because the detainer 
regulation goes beyond communication, and requires prolonged 
detention, the Fourth Amendment issues the Justices avoided by 
construing Section 2(B) as involving only communication are present 
in the detainer regulation. The regulation is invalid to the extent it 
raises these substantial constitutional issues.
251
 
A.  The Centrality of Detainers to 
Federal Immigration Enforcement 
The immigration detainer is the principle mechanism for 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), the immigration 
enforcement arm of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), 
to obtain custody over suspected immigration violators in the 
custody of state or local law enforcement officials. When ICE learns 
that a suspected immigration violator is in a state prison or local jail, 
ICE lodges a detainer, or “Form I-247.”
252
 
Federal immigration officials have long used immigration 
detainers in cases where suspected immigration violators are in the 
custody of local, state, or federal officials.
253
 Before 1987, an 
immigration detainer served merely to notify jail or prison officials 
of federal immigration officials’ interest in a prisoner and to request 
 
 250. See infra Part III.B. 
 251. See infra Part III.B. 
 252. The form detainer has been in existence since at least 1983. Immigration Forms, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 39336-02, 39337 (Sept. 26, 1989) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 299) (referring to Form I-
247 with date of Mar. 1, 1983); Form I-247 (March 1, 1983) (on file with the author). 
Historically, federal immigration officials would also lodge a copy of the immigration charging 
documents with jail or prison officials, and these documents would be considered the equivalent 
of a detainer. E.g., Fernandez-Collado v. INS, 644 F. Supp. 741, 742 (D. Conn. 1986); see 
Jonathan E. Stempel, Custody Battle: The Force of U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 
Detainers over Imprisoned Aliens, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 741, 742 n.11 (1990–1991). 
 253. See generally Lasch, supra note 21, at 182–85 (“In cases as far back as 1950, the 
subjects of INS detainers have raised questions concerning this restraint on liberty.”). 
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jail or prison officials to notify federal immigration officials before 
releasing the targeted prisoner.
254
 In 1987, the executive branch 
enacted federal regulations that required state and local law-
enforcement agencies receiving an immigration detainer for a 
prisoner to maintain custody of the prisoner for up to forty-eight 
hours after his or her release date, in order to allow time for 
immigration officials to arrive and take custody.
255
 Due to the 
enactment of these regulations, the immigration detainer form no 
longer requests only notice of a prisoner’s impending release;
256
 it 
now purports to command state or local officials to maintain in their 
custody a prisoner who otherwise would be released to freedom,
257
 
and to deliver up that person to federal immigration officials.
258
 State 
and local officials regularly comply with immigration detainers by 




 254. See Form I-247 (Mar. 1, 1983) (on file with the author) (“IT IS REQUESTED THAT 
YOU: . . . Notify this office of the time of release at least 30 days prior to release or as much in 
advance of release as possible.”); see also Fernandez-Collado, 644 F. Supp. at 743 n.1 
(describing immigration detainer as “merely a method of advising the prison officials to notify the 
I.N.S. of the petitioner’s release or transfer”). 
 255. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2012); see generally Lasch, supra note 21, at 182–85 (describing the 
history of the current regulatory regime). 
 256. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. 
 257. See Form I-247 (June 2011) (on file with the author) (“IT IS REQUESTED THAT 
YOU: Maintain custody of the subject . . . beyond the time when the subject would otherwise 
have been released from your custody to allow [the Department of Homeland Security] to take 
custody of the subject.”). 
 258. See Form I-247 (Dec. 2012) (on file with the author) (“IT IS REQUESTED THAT 
YOU: Maintain custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS, excluding 
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the subject would have otherwise been 
released from your custody to allow DHS to take custody of the subject. This request derives 
from federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 287.7.”); Form I-247 (Dec. 2011) (on file with the author) (“IT 
IS REQUESTED THAT YOU: Maintain custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 
48 HOURS, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the subject 
would have otherwise been released from your custody to allow DHS to take custody of the 
subject. This request flows from federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 287.7, which provides that a law 
enforcement agency ‘shall maintain custody of an alien’ once a detainer has been issued by 
DHS.”); Form I-247 (Aug. 2010) (on file with the author) (“Under Federal regulation 8 C.F.R. 
§ 287.7, DHS requests that you maintain custody of this individual for a period not to exceed 48 
hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and Federal holidays) to provide adequate time for DHS to 
assume custody of the alien.”); Form I-247 (Apr. 1, 1997) (on file with the author) (“Federal 
regulations (8 C.F.R. § 287.7) require that you detain the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours 
(excluding Saturdays, Sundays and Federal holidays) to provide adequate time for INS to assume 
custody of the alien.”). 
 259. Lasch, supra note 21, at 173–74. 
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Detainers have thus long been a key mechanism in the 
immigration enforcement scheme.
260
 But the importance of detainers 
to federal immigration enforcement was dramatically amplified in 
March 2008, when the federal government launched an immigration 
enforcement program called “Secure Communities.”
261
 The stated 
purpose of the program is to focus on the deportation of immigrants 
who commit serious crimes.
262
 The program targets prisoners who 




The “cornerstone” of the “Secure Communities” program is 
“interoperability”—the linking of federal crime, immigration, and 
fingerprint databases.
264
 Routinely, local law enforcement officials 
submit booking fingerprints to the FBI for criminal background 
checks.
265
 Under “Secure Communities,” the FBI transmits these 
fingerprints to DHS.
266
 DHS then determines which prisoners to 
target for immigration enforcement
267
 and attempts to gain custody 
over those prisoners through the use of immigration detainers—the 
central enforcement tool for the “Secure Communities” program.
268
 
“Secure Communities” vastly increased the use of immigration 
detainers as an enforcement tool.
269
 With this increased use of 




 260. Id. at 174–77. 
 261. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Unveils Sweeping New 
Plan to Target Criminal Aliens in Jails Nationwide (Mar. 28, 2008), http://www.ice.gov/news 
/releases/0804/080414washington.htm. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Buncombe, Henderson, and 
Gaston Sheriffs' Offices in North Carolina Receive Full Interoperability Technology to Help 
Identify Criminal Aliens, ICE (Nov.  18, 2008), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/0811/081118 
charlotte.htm. 
 265. David J. Venturella, Secure Communities: Identifying and Removing Criminal Aliens, 77 
POLICE CHIEF, Sept. 2010, at 40, 43, available at http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/naylor/C 
PIM0910/index.php. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 43–44. 
 268. ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/news/library 
/factsheets/detainer-faqs.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (“Detainers are critical for ICE to be able 
to identify and ultimately remove criminal aliens who are currently in federal, state or local 
custody.”). 
 269. Venturella, supra note 265, at 44. 
 270. In fiscal year 2011, “interoperability” was deployed in 937 new jurisdictions, resulting in 
an increase of over 100,000 “matches” and nearly 30,000 additional deportations. SECURE 
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Immigration detainers have not been immune from the broader 
civil rights debates over immigration.
271
 Since its inception in March 
2008, “Secure Communities” has come under fire from opponents 
and has emerged as a major battleground in the civil-rights war being 
waged over immigration. As opponents of state and local 
enforcement of immigration laws have done, opponents of “Secure 
Communities” argue that the enforcement program encourages racial 
profiling, diverts local resources from crime control, and makes 
communities less safe by discouraging immigrants from reporting 
crimes or cooperating with police.
272
 
Echoing these criticisms, some localities in recent years have 
urged the disentanglement of local law enforcement from federal 
immigration enforcement
273
 and have enacted measures to resist 
immigration rendition by declining to subject prisoners to prolonged 
detention pursuant to detainers.
274
 In Santa Clara County, California, 
for example, the board of supervisors passed a resolution in June 
2010 indicating a clear concern for the civil rights of immigrants.
275
 
The resolution lauded the county as “home to a diverse and vibrant 
community of people representing many races, ethnicities, and 
nationalities, including immigrants from all over the world” and 
opined that “laws like Arizona’s SB 1070 . . . subject individuals to 
racial profiling.”
276
 The resolution affirmed the county’s 
 
COMMUNITIES: IDENT/IAFIS INTEROPERABILITY REPORT, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT 1–2 (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide 
_interoperability_stats-fy2011-to-date.pdf. 
 271. See supra Part II.A. 
 272. E.g., Violeta R. Chapin, ¡Silencio! Undocumented Immigrant Witnesses and the Right to 
Silence, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 119, 152–54 (2011); Secure Communities, NAT’L IMMIGR. 
FORUM (2009), http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/Secure_Communities.pdf; 
More Questions than Answers About Secure Communities, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Mar. 2009), 
http://v2011.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/secure-communities-2009-03-23.pdf. 
 273. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors Res. No. 2010-316 (adopted June 22, 2010) 
[hereinafter Santa Clara 2010-316], available at http://media.sjbeez.org/files/2011/10/Board-
Resolution-2010-316(6-22-2010).pdf. 
 274. Some activity has occurred at the state level as well, with legislation limiting detainer 
compliance enacted in both Connecticut and California. 2013 Conn. Acts 13-155 (Reg. Sess.), 
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/act/pa/pdf/2013PA-00155-R00HB-06659-PA.pdf 
(concerning civil immigration detainers); Patrick McGreevy, Signing Trust Act Is Another Illegal-
Immigration Milestone for Brown, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/local/la-
me-brown-immigration-20131006,0,5441798.story. 
 275. Santa Clara 2010-316. 
 276. Id. 
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commitment to protect all of its residents from “discrimination, 
abuse, violence, and exploitation.”
277
 Ultimately, after extended 
unsuccessful efforts by Santa Clara County to “opt out” of the 
“Secure Communities” program,
278
 the board of supervisors passed a 
measure ending Santa Clara’s routine compliance with detainers.
279
 
In Cook County, Illinois, an ordinance was enacted requiring the 
sheriff to “decline ICE detainer requests unless there is a written 
agreement with the federal government by which all costs incurred 
by Cook County in complying with the ICE detainer shall be 
reimbursed.”
280
 When the ordinance drew a proposal from the federal 
government to pay the costs of detention,
281
 the civil rights issues 
underlying the ordinance became ascendant, with the Cook County 
Board president declaring, “[e]qual justice before the law is more 
important to me than the budgetary considerations.”
282
 
Similar resistance to immigration detainers, grounded in civil 
rights concerns, was seen in other urban centers. In Chicago, Mayor 
Rahm Emanuel introduced his “Welcoming City” antidetainer 
ordinance,
283
 claiming it would “‘prevent law abiding Chicagoans 
 
 277. Id. 
 278. Memorandum from Miguel Marquez, Cnty. Counsel, on U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement’s Secure Communities Program to Public Safety and Justice Committee (Dec. 2, 
2010), available at http://media.sjbeez.org/files/2011/10/9-PSJC-memo-12-2-10.PDF. 
 279. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors Res. No. 2011-504 (adopted Oct. 18, 2011) 
(resolving to decline compliance with immigration detainers unless the federal government 
agreed to pay the costs of detention, and then only if the prisoner was convicted of a serious crime 
and in no case would Santa Clara County comply with a detainer request for a juvenile). 
 280. COOK COUNTY, ILL., CODE § 46-37 (2011) (enacted by Ordinance No. 11-O-73 (Sept. 7, 
2011)). 
 281. Antonio Olivo, Feds Seek Compromise on Cook County Immigration Ordinance: 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director Offers To Pay For Detainer of Suspected Illegal 
Immigrants Who've Posted Bail, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 29, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/ 
2012-02-29/news/ct-met-cook-county-immigration-ordinance-0229-20120229_1_illegal-
immigrants-ice-detainers-immigration-enforcement-agency. 
 282. Hal Dardick, Preckwinkle Ices ICE proposal: Rejects Call For Working Group to 
Resolve Issues, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 10, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-10/news 
/ct-met-toni-preckwinkle-0411-20120411_1_preckwinkle-detainers-immigration-status. 
 283. The ordinance bars compliance with detainers except in cases involving major crimes, 
outstanding criminal warrants, or gang members. CHI., IL., MUN. CODE ch 2-173 (2012), 
available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/SO2012-4984.pdf. 
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from being unfairly detained and deported.’”
284
 Other jurisdictions 
have adopted similar legislation or policies.
285
 





 284. John Presta, Mayor Emanuel Introduces Ordinance to Make Chicago an Immigrant-
Friendly City, EXAMINER.COM (July 11, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/mayor-emanuel 
-introduces-ordinance-to-make-chicago-an-immigrant-friendly-city. 
 285. On the local level, these jurisdictions include Alameda County (California), Milwaukee 
County (Wisconsin), and the cities of Berkeley (California), New York (New York), New 
Orleans (Louisiana), Newark (New Jersey), San Francisco (California), and the District of 
Columbia. Letter from Richard Valle, Supervisor, Dist. 2, Cnty. of Alameda, Cal., to the Bd. of 
Supervisors, Cnty. of Alameda, Cal. (Apr. 17, 2013), available at http://www.acgov.org/board/ 
bos_calendar/documents/DocsAgendaReg_04_23_13/BOARDS%20COMMISSION/Set%20Matt
er%20Calendar/BOS_Approve_a_resolution_regarding_ICE_Civil_Detainer_Requests.pdf 
(seeking approval of Alameda County Board of Supervisors, Resolution No. R-2013-142, File 
No. 28853); Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors, A Resolution Establishing Milwaukee 
County Policy with Respect to Honoring Detainer Requests from U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security—Immigration and Customs Enforcement, MILWAUKEE COUNTY LEGISLATIVE 
INFORMATION CENTER (June 4, 2012), https://milwaukeecounty.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.as 
px?ID=1124069&GUID=3D583485-4F01-4B43-B892-D6FFE5D327BF&Options=&Search=; 
Berkeley City Council, Regular Meeting Annotated Agenda, CITY OF BERKELEY (Oct. 30, 2012), 
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/Clerk/City_Council/2012/10Oct/City_Council__10-30-2012_%E2 
%80%93_Regular_Meeting_Annotated_Agenda.aspx; Mirela Iverac, City Limits Cooperation 
with Federal Immigration Officials at Rikers, WNYC NEWS BLOG (Nov. 22, 2011), 
http://www.wnyc.org/blogs/wnyc-news-blog/2011/nov/22/city-limits-cooperation-ice-rikers/; 
Campbell Robertson, New Orleans and U.S. in Standoff on Detentions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/us/new-orleans-and-us-in-standoff-on-detentions.ht 
ml?_r=0 (detailing New Orleans policy limiting detainer compliance that “came about for a 
variety of reasons, including a lawsuit filed in federal court in 2011 by two men who had spent 
months in Orleans Parish Prison on expired detention requests”); James Queally, Newark Police 
First in N.J. to Refuse to Detain Undocumented Immigrants Accused of Minor Crimes, NJ.COM 
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2013/08/newark_police_first_in_nj_to_ 
refuse_to_detain_illegal_immigrants_accused_of_minor_crimes.html; Brent Begin, San 
Francisco County Jail Won’t Hold Inmates for ICE, S.F. EXAMINER, May 6, 2011, 
http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/san-francisco-county-jail-wont-hold-inmates-for-
ice/Content?oid=2174504 (describing policy adopted by San Francisco Sheriff Michael 
Hennessey); PHIL MENDELSON, COUNCIL OF THE D.C. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON 
BILL 19-585, “IMMIGRATION DETAINER COMPLIANCE AMENDMENT ACT OF 2012” (May 8, 
2012), available at http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/00001/20120604161227.pdf. State-level 
resistance has occurred in Connecticut, Ct. Public Act 13-155 (June 6, 2013), available at 
http://openstates.org/ct/bills/2013/HB6659/, and has been proposed in California, Florida, and 
Massachusetts, Assemb. B. 4, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at http:// 
openstates.org/ca/bills/20132014/AB4/; S.B. 730, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013), available at 
http://openstates.org/fl/bills/2013/S730/documents/FLD00015779/; H.B. 1613, 188th Leg. (Mass. 
2013), available at http://openstates.org/fl/bills/2013/S730/documents/FLD00015779/. 
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B.  “Not the System Congress Created”: 
The Detainer Regulation Is Ultra Vires 
This part details the inconsistencies between the federal detainer 
regulation that the executive branch created in the late 1980s and the 
comprehensive immigration enforcement system that “Congress 
created.” 
It may seem odd that a “preemption” case like Arizona, which is 
ostensibly focused on the conflict between federal and state law, 
should have any bearing on the legality of immigration detainers. An 
immigration detainer is, after all, an explicit request by the federal 
government for state or local help in immigration enforcement.
287
 
How could preemption analysis have any bearing on the legality of 
detainers, when detainers are issued by federal authorities? 
The answer is that there is an area of correspondence between 
the question of whether state law is preempted by federal law and the 
question of whether regulations implemented by the executive 
branch are ultra vires of a congressional grant of authority. The 
analysis of both issues focuses, in the first instance, on congressional 
intent and a consideration of the clarity with which Congress has 
announced its intent. 
Both field and obstacle preemption analyses begin with a 
consideration of the intent of Congress. Field preemption asks 
whether Congress “inten[ded] to displace state law altogether.”
288
 
Obstacle preemption requires “examining the federal statute as a 
whole” to determine Congress’s “purpose and intended effects.”
289
 In 
both types of preemption analysis, courts are cautioned against 





 286. E.g., Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma Cnty. v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 644 F. Supp. 
2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, Brizuela v. Feliciano, No. 3:12-cv-00226-JBA (D. Conn. filed Feb. 13, 2012); 
Reply Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 1:11-cv-
05452 (N.D. Ill. filed Jan. 25, 2012). 
 287. ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/detainer-faqs.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
 288. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012). 
 289. Id. (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000)). 
 290. Id. (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Wyeth v. Levine, 
555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)). 
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Similarly, in considering whether executive regulation is ultra 
vires of statutory authority, the first step of the familiar Chevron 
analysis is to ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the 
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”
291
 
The preemption analysis of the Arizona Court thus involved 
ascertaining, through an examination of Congress’s enactments in 
the field of immigration enforcement, the direction and magnitude of 
congressional intent. This analysis can equally function as the first 
step in the Chevron analysis, as applied to the detainer regulation: 
Has Congress
292
 “directly spoken to the precise question at issue”? 
As is shown below, Congress has spoken directly to the question of 
immigration arrests and has carefully delineated federal, state, and 
local power in this regard. Congress has also directly legislated with 
respect to immigration detainers. 
The Arizona decision discussed and delineated “the system 
Congress created.” Just as Congress held that Section 6 of S.B. 1070 
conflicted with this statutory system, equally so does the immigration 
detainer regulation conflict with Congress’s system.
293
 Whereas the 
preemption analysis employed by the Court examines whether the 
states have exercised more authority than is consistent with the 
 
 291. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
The Administrative Procedure Act allows a challenge to agency regulations that are “in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2006). 
 292. Executive branch regulations are sometimes considered in the preemption analysis. One 
way that regulations may be considered is as evidence of Congress’s intent. See, e.g., R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Cnty., N.C., 479 U.S. 130, 149 (1986) (“[A]s part of the pre-
emption analysis we must consider whether the regulations evidence a desire to occupy a field 
completely.”). Because the Arizona decision focused almost exclusively on Congress’s statutory 
enactments in determining the preemption issue, the complex issues surrounding “agency 
preemption” are not at play. See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2527 (Alito, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (citing Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 
330 (1994)); Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 526 n.14 
(2012) (and authorities cited therein). Indeed, the Arizona opinion demonstrates some hostility to 
“agency preemption”—making clear that the executive does not set immigration policy. In its 
analysis of Section 2(B) the Court looked to Congress’s statutory scheme in determining that “the 
federal scheme thus leaves room for a policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine 
matter,” dispensing with the argument of the United States that such routine contact would 
undermine federal immigration policy (as set by the executive branch). Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 
2508. 
 293. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507. 
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congressional statutory scheme, the question in the Chevron analysis 
is whether the executive branch has exercised excessive authority.
294
 
1.  “Not The System Congress Created” 
As noted above, until the 1980s, immigration detainers were 
nothing more than a request for advance notification before the 
release of a prisoner.
295
 Beginning in 1987,
296
 the executive branch 
implemented regulations requiring officials receiving an immigration 
detainer to maintain custody of a prisoner who would otherwise be 
released.
297
 The current version of the regulation provides: 
Upon a determination by the Department to issue a 
detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a criminal 
justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the 
alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding 
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit 




 294. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 295. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 297. Whether an immigration detainer operates to require officials to maintain custody over a 
prisoner who would otherwise be released, or only to request that officials maintain custody, has 
been a matter of some confusion. See KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RES. SERVICE, IMMIGRATION 
DETAINERS: LEGAL ISSUES 11–14 (Aug. 31, 2012) (detailing authorities supporting the position 
that the detainer is a request and authorities supporting the position that the detainer is a 
command). Some language in the detainer regulation itself seems to suggest that the detainer is 
only a request for advance notification of a prisoner’s upcoming release. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) 
(2012) (“A detainer serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the Department seeks 
custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and 
removing the alien. The detainer is a request that such agency advise the Department, prior to 
release of the alien, in order for the Department to arrange to assume custody, in situations when 
gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible.”). However, the 
language of 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) is clear and unmistakable in requiring that officials prolong 
custody of a prisoner subject to an immigration detainer. See C.F.R. § 287.7(d); Rios-Quiroz v. 
Williamson Cnty., No. 3-11-1168, slip op. at 7 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2012) (holding that use of 
“shall” in 8 CFR § 287.7(d) renders the regulation mandatory upon state officials). 
 298. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d). The regulation in its entirety provides: 
§ 287.7 DETAINER PROVISIONS UNDER SECTION 287(D)(3) OF THE ACT. 
(a) Detainers in general. Detainers are issued pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the 
Act and this chapter 1. Any authorized immigration officer may at any time issue a 
Form I-247, Immigration Detainer-Notice of Action, to any other Federal, State, or 
local law enforcement agency. A detainer serves to advise another law enforcement 
agency that the Department seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that 
agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien. The detainer is a request 
that such agency advise the Department, prior to release of the alien, in order for the 
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The detainer regulation indicates no prerequisites to the issuance of a 
detainer
299
 and authorizes issuance of a detainer “at any time.”
300
 
The regulation runs headlong into the statutory “system 
Congress created” in two ways. First, the regulation permits federal 
immigration officials, through the use of a detainer issued to other 
“criminal justice” officials, to effectuate arrests in circumstances 
beyond the statutory arrest authority Congress bestowed on those 
federal immigration officials. In doing so, the executive branch has 





Department to arrange to assume custody, in situations when gaining immediate 
physical custody is either impracticable or impossible. 
(b) Authority to issue detainers. The following officers are authorized to issue 
detainers: 
(1) Border patrol agents, including aircraft pilots; 
(2) Special agents; 
(3) Deportation officers; 
(4) Immigration inspectors; 
(5) Adjudications officers; 
(6) Immigration enforcement agents; 
(7) Supervisory and managerial personnel who are responsible for 
supervising the activities of those officers listed in this paragraph; and 
(8) Immigration officers who need the authority to issue detainers 
under section 287(d)(3) of the Act in order to effectively accomplish 
their individual missions and who are designated individually or as a 
class, by the Commissioner of CBP, the Assistant Secretary for ICE, or 
the Director of the BCIS. 
(c) Availability of records. In order for the Department to accurately determine the 
propriety of issuing a detainer, serving a notice to appear, or taking custody of an 
alien in accordance with this section, the criminal justice agency requesting such 
action or informing the Department of a conviction or act that renders an alien 
inadmissible or removable under any provision of law shall provide the Department 
with all documentary records and information available from the agency that 
reasonably relates to the alien's status in the United States, or that may have an 
impact on conditions of release. 
(d) Temporary detention at Department request. Upon a determination by the 
Department to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a criminal 
justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the alien for a period not to 
exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit 
assumption of custody by the Department. 
(e) Financial responsibility for detention. No detainer issued as a result of a 
determination made under this chapter I shall incur any fiscal obligation on the part 
of the Department, until actual assumption of custody by the Department, except as 
provided in paragraph (d) of this section. 
§ 287.7. 
 299. See § 287.7(a)–(e). 
 300. § 287.7(a). 
 301. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505–10 (2012). 
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From the Court’s discussion of Section 2(B), it is clear that 
prolonged detention, such as that explicitly required by the detainer 
regulation, operates as an arrest. The Court was clear that 
“[d]etaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status 
would raise constitutional concerns.”
302
 In the Court’s view, Section 
2(B) avoided those constitutional concerns because the status check 
was presumed to take place “during the course of an authorized, 
lawful detention or after a detainee has been released.”
303
 Section 
2(B) was thus deemed to be principally about communication, not 
detention. 
The immigration detainer regulation, unlike Section 2(B), 
explicitly calls for prolonged detention—directing the criminal 
justice agency receiving a detainer to “maintain custody” of a 
prisoner who is “not otherwise detained.”
304
 The immigration 
detainer’s forty-eight-hour holding period thus begins to run only 




That prolonged detention beyond the termination of an 
otherwise lawful detention would be a “seizure” within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment is clear from the Arizona opinions.
306
 The 
majority opinion upheld Section 2(B) precisely because it was 
limited to involve only communication and not a prolonged 
detention. Justice Alito conceded that prolonged detention amounting 
to a new arrest would require probable cause of a new crime beyond 




 302. Id. at 2509. 
 303. Id. 
 304. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d). 
 305. See id. 
 306. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct at 2509; id. at 2528–29 (Alito, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). Pending lawsuits have raised this claim that immigration detainers run afoul of 
the Fourth Amendment. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint at 1, Brizuela v. 
Feliciano, No. 3:12-cv-00226-JBA (D. Conn. filed Feb. 13, 2012); Reply in Support of 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 3, Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 1:11-cv-05452 (N.D. Ill. filed 
Jan. 25, 2012). 
 307. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2529 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985) and describing Hayes as “holding that the line 
between detention and arrest is crossed ‘when the police, without probable cause or a warrant, 
forcibly remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport 
him to the police station, where he is detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes’”). The 
continued jailing of a prisoner who is otherwise free to return home surely constitutes a seizure 
requiring probable cause. See Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816–17. 
  
686 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:629 
The issuance of immigration detainers is not restricted to 
circumstances under which immigration officials are entitled to make 
an arrest. Therefore, it is important that an immigration detainer acts 
as an arrest of a prisoner who would otherwise be released. As the 
Court pointed out in striking down Section 6, immigration officials 
may effect an immigration arrest either (1) pursuant to an 
immigration arrest warrant
308
 or (2) in limited circumstances when 
 
 308. One possible argument is that a detainer is a specific example of the “arrest warrant” 
authority Congress granted to the Attorney General in Section 236(a) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act. In litigation, the United States has pointed to Section 236(a) as a possible source 
of authority for the detainer regulation. Federal Defendants’ Notice of Motion to Dismiss; 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 13–16, Comm. for Immigrant 
Rights of Sonoma Cnty. v. County of Sonoma, No. 3:08-cv-04220-RS, (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 28, 
2009). But the use of detainers as arrest warrants would raise a serious constitutional concern. 
While the Court has upheld the authority of federal immigration officials to detain suspected 
immigration violators pending an adjudication of their status, see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 
523–30 (2003) (distinguishing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (involving “detention 
pending a determination of removability”)), the Court has not endorsed the use of arrest warrants 
to investigate a person’s immigration status. Cf. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975) 
(holding “[t]he impropriety of the arrest was obvious” where detectives admitted the arrest was 
for investigation). Arrests for investigation only would implicate Fourth Amendment concerns. 
Yet what evidence is available indicates detainers are often placed for no stated reason other than 
investigation. See Lasch, supra note 21, at 173–82. The INA provisions allowing warrantless 
arrests have been interpreted as requiring probable cause. United States v. Cantu, 519 F.2d 494, 
496 (7th Cir. 1975) (“The words of the statute ‘reason to believe’ are properly taken to signify 
probable cause.”) (citing Au Yi Lau v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 
222 (D.C. Cir. 1971)); Au Yi Lau, 445 F.2d at 223 (“[S]ince aliens in this country are sheltered by 
the Fourth Amendment in common with citizens, such a reading of the Congressional mandate 
must be controlled by the constitutional standards governing similar detentions made by other law 
enforcement officials.”). Similarly, Section 236(a) should be read as imposing a probable cause 
requirement before issuance of an administrative arrest warrant. Since the detainer regulation 
involves no probable cause requirement, it cannot be characterized as an arrest warrant. 
Furthermore, such a characterization would be inconsistent with practice. Current regulations 
delineate a different set of immigration officials authorized to issue arrest warrants from the set 
authorized to issue detainers. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2) (2012) (discussing arrest warrant 
authority), with 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(b) (discussing detainer authority). It appears that some lower-
level officials who lack the authority to issue arrest warrants are authorized to issue detainers. 
Compare 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(b)(2) (authorizing “special agents” to issue detainers), with 8 C.F.R. 
§ 287.5(e)(2)(xxix)–(xxxiii) (authorizing only various types of “special agents in charge” to issue 
arrest warrants); compare 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(b)(3) (authorizing “deportation officers” to issue 
detainers), with 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2)(xxv) (only authorizing “supervisory deportation officers” 
to issue arrest warrants). Additionally, the Form I-247 detainer form indicates one reason a 
detainer may be issued is pursuant to an administrative arrest warrant, indicating the two are not 
synonymous. See Form I-247, October 2011 (on file with the author). Furthermore, had Congress 
intended detainers to be warrants, it would not have used both terms in the INA. Compare 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006) (using “warrant”), with 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (using “detainer”). 
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the person is “likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.”
309
 
The detainer regulation requires neither of these prerequisites. Thus, 
detainers can be issued in circumstances well beyond those in which 
immigration officials can make an arrest. The detainer regulation, 




It might be argued that persons detained in the custody of a law 
enforcement agency should be presumed a flight risk, and therefore 
“likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.”
311
 While this 
argument might have force in a particular case, it sweeps too broadly 
to justify the detainer regulation, which does not preclude detainers 
being placed in circumstances where immigration officials clearly 
can obtain a warrant before the prisoner’s release.
312
 Had Congress 
 
 309. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)). The Court did not explicitly 
note the other important requirement of § 1357—that an immigration official making a 
warrantless arrest have “reason to believe” the arrestee has violated federal immigration law. See 
id. Courts have construed the “reason to believe” requirement as importing a probable cause 
requirement in order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
seizures. Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication 
of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1608 & n.229 (2010). 
 The Court also ignored a statutory provision directing the Attorney General to take into 
custody certain aliens who are deportable or inadmissible by virtue of criminal convictions or acts 
of terrorism. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). This statutory provision (cited only in Justice Alito’s opinion, 
see Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2533–34 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part)), requires more than probable cause, since it is only triggered in the case of an alien who is 
deportable or inadmissible. Id. The statute also requires the Attorney General to take custody of 
such a person “when the alien is released”—which courts have interpreted as a limitation on 
Congress’s command. Saysana v. Gillen, 590 F.3d 7, 14–16 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that the 
“when released” provision limits the statute’s applicability to only those instances when the alien 
is released from detention on the crimes which render him or her deportable or inadmissible); 
Thomas v. Hogan, No. 1:08-CV-0417, 2008 WL 4793739, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2008) 
(holding the same). The detainer regulation fails to track the specific requirements of this 
statutory provision and therefore is inconsistent with the “system Congress created” when 
considering this provision as well. 
 310. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2496. 
 311. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)). 
 312. The case of John Henry demonstrates that immigration officials lodging an immigration 
detainer may well have ample time to obtain a warrant. Henry v. Chertoff, 317 Fed. App’x. 178, 
179–80 (3d Cir. 2009). Mr. Henry was serving a 262-month sentence in federal prison when he 
sought to challenge an immigration detainer placed against him. Id. at 179. He filed his habeas 
petition in June 2008, alleging he was a United States citizen. Id. The district court dismissed Mr. 
Henry’s habeas petition on the grounds he was not “in custody” pursuant to the detainer for 
purposes of habeas jurisdiction. Id. After Mr. Henry filed his appellate brief, he was released from 
the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, on August 22, 2008. Id. at 179 n.2. Thus, Mr. Henry was in 
custody for approximately two months while the detainer was lodged. Surely immigration 
officials could have obtained a warrant for Mr. Henry’s arrest during that time. Given that there is 
 
  
688 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:629 
statutorily determined that prisoners are categorically to be 
considered flight risks, there might be something to this argument. 
For example, the no-bail provisions of the INA have been upheld on 
the ground that Congress reasonably concluded that persons 
convicted of certain enumerated crimes posed a flight risk and should 
therefore be detained during their removal proceedings.
313
 But in the 
case of detainers, there is no requirement that the target of the 
detainer has been convicted of any crime. Nor is there a requirement 
that the target of the detainer be subject to removal proceedings.
314
 
Second, to the extent the detainer regulation purports to 
authorize or compel state and local law enforcement to make such 
arrests, the regulation runs afoul of Congress’s limited allocation of 
immigration enforcement power to state officials. As the Court 
discussed in finding Section 6 preempted, Congress has specifically 
granted immigration enforcement authority to state officials only in 
narrow circumstances—most notably when local officials participate 
in a so-called 287(g) agreement. Enforcement beyond those narrow 
circumstances is preempted. Because the detainer regulation calls for 
state and local officials to participate in civil immigration 
enforcement beyond those narrow circumstances, it is inconsistent 
with the “system Congress created.”
315
 
However, the Court qualified its discussion of Section 6 by 
noting that Section 6 authorized the “unilateral decision of state 
officers to arrest an alien for being removable absent any request, 
approval, or other instruction from the Federal Government.”
316
 The 
detainer regulation, one could argue, looks less like the unilateral 
state action of Section 6 found preempted in Arizona and more like 
what the Arizona Court found Section 6 not to be: “cooperat[ion] 
with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, 
 
nothing in the detainer regulation to limit the use of detainers to circumstances other than those 
like Mr. Henry’s, there is no reason to believe a suspected immigration violator’s current 
imprisonment makes the person “likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” Indeed, in 
many instances the person will be less likely to escape—as was true for Mr. Henry—because he 
or she is imprisoned. 
 313. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 518–22. 
 314. Even if the presence of a person in custody could suffice to meet categorically the 
“likely to escape” requirement for a warrantless arrest, the detainer regulation would still fail for 
lack of a probable cause requirement. See Dardick, supra note 282. 
 315. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506. 
 316. Id. at 2507. 
  
Winter 2013] ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES 689 
detention or removal” of immigration violators.
317
 Detainers are, 
after all, initiated by the federal government. 
This argument would have more force if the immigration 
detainer regulation had been phrased in terms of cooperation. After 
all, as the Court pointed out, there is nothing inhibiting 
communication between law enforcement agencies and federal 
immigration officials; indeed, it is encouraged.
318
 But while there has 
been much debate over whether immigration detainers are federal 
government requests for cooperation or commands for 
compliance,
319
 it is hard to see how the mandatory language of the 
detainer regulation, which states that a criminal justice agency 
receiving an immigration detainer “shall maintain custody” over the 
prisoner,
320
 is consistent with Congress’s limited allowance for state 






Even if the regulation called only for cooperation, it is not clear 
from the Arizona opinion that the cooperation statutorily authorized 
by Congress would include making civil immigration arrests. The 
Court mentioned that such cooperation might include “operational 
support in executing a warrant,”
323
 but the Court elsewhere took 
 
 317. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B) (2006). 
 318. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(A)). Congress has not only 
legislated to encourage such communication. Congress has made it unlawful to prevent such 
communication. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, 
or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any 
way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration 
status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (“Notwithstanding any other 
provision of Federal, State, or local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or 
in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the 
United States.”). 
 319. See MANUEL, supra note 297, at 11–14 (2012) (detailing authorities in support of 
position that detainer is a request and authorities in support of position that detainer is a 
command). 
 320. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2012). 
 321. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10). 
 322. See Rios-Quiroz v. Williamson Cnty., No. 3-11-1168, 2012 WL 3945354, at *4 (M.D. 
Tenn. Sept. 10, 2012) (holding that use of “shall” in 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) renders the regulation 
mandatory upon state officials). Because the detainer purports to command state and local 
officials to act, it raises significant Tenth Amendment problems. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 323. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507 (citing DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., GUIDANCE ON STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ ASSISTANCE IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND RELATED 
MATTERS 13–14 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/guidance-state-local-
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pains to note that immigration warrants “are executed by federal 
officers who have received training in the enforcement of 
immigration law.”
324
 The Court also specifically noted that state and 
local officials are required to receive such training when they enter 
into a 287(g) agreement with the federal government,
325
 and it is 
reasonable to conclude from the Court’s discussion that state and 
local officials would be preempted from actually effectuating 
immigration arrests (as contrasted to providing “operational 
support”
326
) absent a 287(g) agreement and the training it requires. 
The final argument in support of the detainer regulation involves 
a statute discussed only in passing in the Arizona decision—Section 
287(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act—which I consider in 
the next section. 
2.  The Detainer System Congress Did Authorize 
The only use of the word “detainer” in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) is in Section 287(d), enacted as part of the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.
327
 The statutory provision allows 
 
assistance-immigration-enforcement.pdf). In discussing what might constitute “cooperation” 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10), the majority explicitly mentioned immigration detainers. The 
Court’s citation to immigration detainers as an example of state officers assisting federal 
immigration officials is discussed below. See infra notes 339–342 and accompanying text. 
 324. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.2(b); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(3)). 
 325. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(c)). 
 326. The Arizona majority cited a DHS publication to support the notion that “provid[ing] 
operational support in exe-cuting a warrant” would be an example of state-federal “cooperation” 
under INA § 287(g)(10). Id. at 2507. But the examples of such “operational support” given in the 
DHS document are “providing tactical officers to join the federal officials during higher risk 
operations, or providing perimeter security for the operation (e.g., blocking off public streets)”—
not making actual arrests. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 323, at 13. The DHS document 
only envisions state and local officers actually seizing a person “[w]here independent state or 
local law grounds provide a basis for doing so” and then only “at the request of DHS immigration 
officers where the seizure or stop would aid an ongoing federal investigation into possible 
violations of federal immigration law.” DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 323, at 13. 
 327. Section 287(d) provides: 
DETAINER OF ALIENS FOR VIOLATION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES LAWS. 
In the case of an alien who is arrested by a Federal, State, or local law enforcement 
official for a violation of any law relating to controlled substances, if the official (or 
another official)— 
(1) has reason to believe that the alien may not have been lawfully admitted to the 
United States or otherwise is not lawfully present in the United States, 
(2) expeditiously informs an appropriate officer or employee of the Service 
authorized and designated by the Attorney General of the arrest and of facts 
concerning the status of the alien, and 
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federal, state, and local law enforcement officials to request federal 
immigration officials “to determine promptly whether or not to issue 
a detainer to detain the alien.”
328
 Because this statute does authorize 
some use of immigration detainers, it is important to examine 
Section 287(d) to determine whether it can support the executive 
branch’s detainer regulation. 
Problems immediately arise given the limitations on the detainer 
authority that might be granted under Section 287(d). The statute is 
explicitly limited to cases involving controlled substance arrests.
329
 
Furthermore, the request for a detainer must be made by the arresting 
agency, and then only when there is “reason to believe” (a standard 
equating to probable cause)
330
 the arrestee is an immigration 
violator.
331
 The executive branch’s detainer regulation exceeds the 
narrow scope of INA Section 287(d), authorizing the issuance of a 
detainer by “[a]ny authorized immigration officer . . . at any time.”
332
 
The federal government’s litigation position has been that its 
authority to issue detainers is neither generated nor constrained by 
Section 287(d);
333
 rather, detainers stem from the federal 
 
(3) requests the Service to determine promptly whether or not to issue a detainer to 
detain the alien, the officer or employee of the Service shall promptly determine 
whether or not to issue such a detainer. If such a detainer is issued and the alien is 
not otherwise detained by Federal, State, or local officials, the Attorney General 
shall effectively and expeditiously take custody of the alien. 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2006). 
 328. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d)(3). 
 329. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 330. United States v. Cantu, 519 F.2d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 1975) (“The words of the statute 
‘reason to believe’ are properly taken to signify probable cause.”) (citing Au Yi Lau v. U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1971)); Au Yi Lau, 445 F.2d 
at 223 (“[S]ince aliens in this country are sheltered by the Fourth Amendment in common with 
citizens, such a reading of the Congressional mandate must be controlled by the constitutional 
standards governing similar detentions made by other law enforcement officials.”). 
 331. For a more detailed argument on these points, see Lasch, supra note 21, at 173–82. 
 332. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2012). 
 333. One federal district court has agreed with this interpretation. In Comm. for Immigrant 
Rights of Sonoma Cnty. v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2009), the district 
court concluded that the regulation was not ultra vires of its enabling legislation. Id. at 1198. The 
court first concluded that the detainer statute (INA § 287(d)) was not meant to limit the situations 
in which the federal government might issue a detainer—rather, the detainer statute was meant to 
impose additional requirements on the federal government in controlled substance cases (the 
statute requires federal immigration officials to “promptly determine whether or not to issue such 
a detainer” upon request in such cases). Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d)). Legislative history not 
cited by the court or the parties supports the court’s conclusion. 132 CONG. REC. 22,981 (1986) 
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government’s general authority to take immigration violators into 
custody. But the general authority relied on by the federal 
government has been circumscribed by Congress in ways 
inconsistent with the detainer regulation’s sweeping language.
334
 
Section 287(d), with its own constraints, cannot save the regulation 
and its broad authority to detain from exceeding Congress’s statutory 
authorization. 
It might be argued that Congress did intend to grant civil arrest 
authority to state officials in narrow circumstances through the 
detainer provision it enacted in Section 287(d), just as Congress did 
later with Section 287(g). The specific description of a “detainer to 
detain the alien” implies that the detainer will actually serve to detain 
its target. Furthermore, the provision arguably avoids Fourth and 
Tenth Amendment issues by requiring initiation of the detainer 
process by the arresting law enforcement agency (rather than 
allowing federal immigration authorities to initiate the detainer 
process by commanding state or local agencies to hold a prisoner in 




Yet, even if Section 287(d) could be read as granting civil arrest 
authority to state and local officers, the executive branch’s detainer 
regulation exceeds the scope of that statutory authority. 
Furthermore, the better reading is that Congress meant the word 
“detainer” in Section 287(d) in the sense in which immigration 
 
(indicating the provision for detainers in INA § 287(d) was added in response to “local law 
enforcement complaints concerning the INS’ inability to issue a judgment on a suspect’s 
citizenship status fast enough to allow the authorities to continue to detain him,” and was 
intended to mandate a faster response from federal immigration authorities to requests initiated by 
local law enforcement). 
 334. See supra Part III.A (noting that immigration officials are statutorily empowered to 
arrest only when they have a warrant, INA § 236(a), probable cause, INA § 287(a)(2), (4), (5), or 
certain knowledge of a person’s deportability or inadmissibility, INA § 236(c)). 
 335. See infra Part III.C (discussing the Tenth Amendment and Fourth Amendment issues 
presented by the immigration detainer regulation). It seems odd, given Congress’s low estimation 
of state and local officials’ competency with respect to immigration, that Congress would have 
entrusted those officials, rather than federal immigration officials, with the probable cause 
determination. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(b) (requiring training and supervision as a prerequisite to a 
grant of immigration enforcement authority to state and local officials). A more likely explanation 
is that 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) simply indicates the circumstances under which state and local officials 
should contact federal immigration officials for a detainer—not in every arrest involving 
controlled substances, but only the subset of controlled substance arrests in which there is reason 
to believe the arrestee may be present without authorization. 
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detainers had been used until that time—as a request for notice of 
impending release, not as a command for continued detention. The 
Form I-247 detainer in use prior to the enactment of Section 287(d) 
clearly announced that it was a request only for advance notice. 
There are at least three reasons to interpret Section 287(d) as 
using the word “detainer” as it had been used in the immigration 
field prior to its enactment. First, this interpretation is consistent with 
available legislative history indicating Section 287(d) did not create 
any new detainer authority, but only created an obligation for federal 
immigration officials to respond to other law enforcement agencies’ 
requests for prompt action.
336
 Second, as the federal government has 
argued, the language of Section 287(d) seems too obscure to have 
been intended as a grant of otherwise nonexistent arrest authority
337
 
and is better read as imposing special requirements on an already 
existing detainer authority. Third, the Arizona Court read Section 




Indeed, the Arizona Court’s single reference to Section 287(d) is 
telling. In rejecting the argument that civil immigration arrests under 
Section 6 of S.B. 1070 should be upheld under the “cooperation” 
provision of Section 287(g), the Court cited Section 287(d) as an 
example of cooperation. The majority described Section 287(d) as 
allowing “State officials . . . [to] assist the Federal Government by 
responding to requests for information about when an alien will be 
released from their custody.”
339
 Characterizing Section 287(d) as 
authorizing communication, rather than arrest, directly supports an 
interpretation of Section 287(d) as embodying the existing detainer 
practice, which had been nothing more than information sharing 
between the federal, state, and local agencies. 
 
 336. 132 CONG. REC. 22,981 (1986). This legislative history also tends to undermine any 
argument that Congress crafted Section 287(d) to avoid Tenth Amendment concerns by requiring 
initiation of the detainer process by the arresting agency. The legislative history indicates 287(d) 
was meant to require the federal government to be responsive to state and local agencies—hence 
the language indicating initiation of the process at the arresting agency level. 
 337. See Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma Cnty., 644 F. Supp. 2d at 1199 (“[T]he court 
reads the language of § 1357 as simply placing special requirements on officials issuing detainers 
for a violation of any law relating to controlled substances.”). 
 338. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507 (2012). 
 339. Id. 
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In characterizing immigration detainers as communication rather 
than arrests, the Court implicitly rejected the brief for the United 
States, which offered a broad characterization of state cooperation 
with respect to detainers. The United States suggested immigration 
detainers were an example of arrests made as part of “cooperative 
enforcement”: 
Such broad and unilateral arrest authority also is not 
necessary to facilitate true cooperative enforcement. State 
and local officials (including in Arizona) have long made 
arrests at the request of federal immigration officials, and 
federal officials may place detainers on aliens who are 
wanted by DHS but who otherwise would be released from 
state or local custody.
340
 
Tellingly, the United States cited the detainer regulation and not 
the statute.
341
 The regulation clearly authorizes—indeed compels—
prolonged detention amounting to an arrest by state or local officials. 
The statute is not clear, and the United States has argued elsewhere 
that it does not constrain or generate authority to detain.
342
 
The Arizona majority failed to accept the characterization of 
detainers as arrests, instead viewing detainers as a “request[] for 
information about when an alien will be released from [state or local] 
custody.”
343
 This view of detainers tracked precisely the historical 
use of detainers prior to the adoption of 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. Perhaps 
because the immigration detainer regulation flies directly in the face 
of the statutory system just delineated by the Court—the “system that 
Congress created”—the Court did not cite the regulation. Instead, it 
cited the detainer statute, endorsing the view that the statute simply 
authorizes the use of detainers for cooperative enforcement by 
allowing local officials not to arrest suspected immigration violators 
but to advise federal immigration officials of their impending release. 
 
 340. Brief for the United States at 54, Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (No. 11-182), 2012 WL 
939048 at *54 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 287.7). 
 341. Id. 
 342. See supra note 332 and accompanying text. 
 343. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d)). 
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3.  Conclusion: 
The Immigration Detainer Is 
Nothing More than a Request for Information 
The Supreme Court in Arizona held that Section 6 of S.B. 1070 
was preempted because it created a system for immigration 
enforcement that was “not the system Congress created.”
344
 The 
same is true of the executive branch’s detainer regulation, and the 
specific conflicts between it and Congress’s statutory scheme cause 
it equally to be an obstacle to Congress’s enforcement plan. The 
regulation must be held to be beyond Congress’s statutory authority. 
The statutory scheme that Congress did put in place for immigration 
detainers is consistent with historical practice—the detainer is issued 
by federal immigration officials and acts only as a request for notice 
before the prisoner, who is the target of the detainer, is released from 
custody. The detainer does not bind the receiving agency in any way. 
C.  The Detainer Regulation 
Is Invalid Because It Raises 
Substantial Constitutional Problems 
Agency regulations cannot stand if they raise serious 
constitutional doubts.
345
 Congress is assumed to legislate in light of 
constitutional limitations, and therefore Congress cannot be assumed 




The executive branch’s detainer regulation raises substantial 
constitutional questions. The regulation raises Fourth Amendment 
questions because there is no requirement of probable cause prior to 
prolonged detention pursuant to a detainer. Additionally, there is no 
requirement that a person held pursuant to a detainer be taken before 
a neutral magistrate within forty-eight hours absent extraordinary 
 
 344. Id. at 2496. 
 345. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(b) (permitting challenge to regulations that are “contrary to 
constitutional right”); see also Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: 
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1944 
(2008) (citing SWANCC) (“Any regulation that raises constitutional doubts is invalid unless 
Congress clearly authorized that result.”); Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 
244 & n.244 (2006) (citing Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 
172−73 (2001)). 
 346. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190−91 (1991) (citations omitted). 
  
696 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:629 
circumstances. The regulation also raises a substantial Tenth 
Amendment question because the regulation purports to allow 
federal officials to command state and local officials to detain 
prisoners in violation of the anti-commandeering principle. 
1.  The Detainer Regulation Raises Substantial Fourth Amendment 
Problems 
“I agree with the Court that individuals cannot be detained 
solely to verify their immigration status,” President Barack Obama 
said upon learning of the Arizona decision.
347
 Yet, immigration 
detainers issued by federal immigration officials routinely do just 
that. 
The detainer regulation commands state and local officials to 
maintain custody over a suspected immigration violator beyond the 
time normally authorized, raising the same “prolonged detention” 
concern presented by Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 and discussed in the 
Arizona opinions. Because the regulation contains neither a warrant 
requirement
348
 nor a probable cause requirement, the same Fourth 
Amendment concerns are present as were discussed in Arizona. 
The absence of a probable cause requirement routinely appears 
to result in warrantless investigatory arrests pursuant to immigration 
detainers. ICE typically lodges a detainer against a suspected 
immigration violator by faxing the Form I-247 detainer to the prison 
or jail. The Form I-247 detainer has a set of boxes, which ICE 
officials can check to indicate ICE’s level of prior investigation and 
interest.
349
 For years, the boxes were: 
( ) Investigation has been initiated to determine whether this 
person is subject to removal from the United States. 
( ) A Notice to Appear or other charging document 
initiating removal proceedings, a copy of which is attached, 
was served on ___(date)___ 
 
 347. Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on the Supreme Court’s 
Ruling on Arizona v. United States (June 25, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2012/06/25/statement-president-supreme-court-s-ruling-arizona-v-united-states; see 
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509 (“Detaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status 
would raise constitutional concerns.”). 
 348. It cannot be argued that the detainer is equivalent to a warrant. See supra note 309 and 
accompanying text. 
 349. Form I-247, October 2011 (on file with the author). 
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( ) A warrant of arrest in removal proceedings, a copy of 
which is attached, was served on ___(date)___ 




The available evidence suggests that many, if not most, 
detainers are issued based only on “investigation initiated” and not 
on the basis of a Notice to Appear, warrant, or prior order.
351
 ICE has 
been criticized for “poor targeting of government removal efforts,”
352
 
suggesting that the amount of investigation prior to the issuance of a 
detainer may be minimal. Additionally, critics have suggested the 
databases on which ICE relies are of questionable accuracy.
353
 Thus, 
the Fourth Amendment concerns behind a detainer issued based only 
on “investigation initiated” may be substantial.
354
 Indeed, even if one 
 
 350. Id. In December 2012, perhaps responding to the Arizona decision and Fourth 
Amendment concerns, DHS issued anew detainer guidance and a revised Form I-247. For a 
complete discussion of the December 2012 revisions, see Christopher N. Lasch, Preempting 
Immigration Detainer Enforcement Under Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & 
POL’Y 281, 302-05 (2013). 
 351. Lasch, supra note 21, at 173−82. 
 352. ICE Seeks to Deport the Wrong People, TRACIMMIGRATION (Nov. 9, 2010), http://trac 
.syr.edu/immigration/reports/243/ (documenting DHS’s rising failure rate in immigration 
proceedings). 
 353. Ajmel Quereshi, Hope for Change in Immigration Policy: Recommendations for the 
Obama Administration, 16 NO. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 19, 22−23 (2009). 
 354. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601–05 (1975) (holding arrest for purposes of 
investigation violated Fourth Amendment). The December 2012 detainer guidance states that 
immigration officials “should” place a detainer only where there is “reason to believe” an 
individual is subject to removal and additional conditions are present. Memorandum from John 
Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to All Field Office Dirs., All Special 
Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Guidance on the Use 
of Detainers in the Federal, State, Local, and Tribal Criminal Justice Systems 2 (Dec. 21, 2012), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/detainer-policy.pdf. But this guidance cannot 
eliminate this substantial Fourth Amendment concern. First, the guidance is expressed not as a 
legal position of DHS but as an enforcement priority. The guidance contains an express 
disclaimer stating the guidance does not “limit the legal authority of ICE or its personnel” and 
does not “create any right . . . enforceable at law by any party.” Id. at 3. The guidance also 
excludes U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) from its ambit, further emphasizing the 
document’s function as an enforcement priority policy position as opposed to a legal position. 
The guidance also calls for a six-month review, whereupon “ICE will consider whether 
modifications, if any, are needed.” Id. There is no guarantee, in other words, that ICE will not 
return to its practice, prevailing over the thirty years prior to the revised guidance, of issuing 
detainers upon nothing more than an initiated investigation into whether an individual is subject 
to removal. The detainer regulation, after all, does not require “reason to believe” or any other 
level of suspicion prior to issuing a detainer. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2012). 
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of the other three boxes on the detainer form is checked, probable 
cause may yet be lacking.
355
 
An additional Fourth Amendment concern arises from the 
detainer regulation’s command that the state or local agency with 
custody over the suspected immigration violator “shall maintain 
custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding 
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit assumption of 
custody by the Department.”
356
 This command runs directly counter 
to the Court’s declaration that the Fourth Amendment requires any 
person subjected to a warrantless arrest be brought before a neutral 
magistrate for a probable cause determination within forty-eight 
hours—including weekends and holidays—absent a showing of 
extraordinary circumstances.
357
 The immigration detainer regulation 
thus violates the Fourth Amendment in two ways.
358
 First, a prisoner 
may be detained for longer than forty-eight hours (indeed, up to five 
days on a holiday weekend) without appearing for a probable cause 
determination.
359
 Second, the regulation includes no mandatory 
appearance before a neutral magistrate.
360
 
2.  The Detainer Regulation Raises Substantial Tenth Amendment 
Problems 
Although questions of federal commandeering of state officials 
were not present with respect to S.B. 1070, such Tenth Amendment 
concerns do attend immigration detainers and are worthy of a brief 
discussion here. There has been considerable debate and confusion 
over whether immigration detainers act as a federal request or as a 
command to state or local officials.
361
 The regulation itself purports 
 
 355. Compare supra note 309 (discussing absence of probable cause requirement in INA 
§ 236(a), the statute authorizing administrative arrest warrants in immigration proceedings), with 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 239(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (indicating that the Notice to 
Appear must specify the “acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of law”). 
 356. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2012). 
 357. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56−57 (1991). 
 358. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d). 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. 
 361. See MANUEL, supra note 297, at 11–14 (detailing authorities supporting the position that 
the detainer is a request and authorities supporting the position that the detainer is a command); 
Rios-Quiroz v. Williamson Cnty., No. 3-11-1168, slip op. at 7 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2012) 
(holding that use of “shall” in 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) renders the regulation mandatory upon state 
officials). 
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to command state and local law enforcement agencies receiving an 
immigration detainer to continue holding the target of the detainer in 
custody.
362
 This raises the question of whether the claimed 
compulsion of state officials by the federal government violates the 
Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers to the States. 
Modern jurisprudence suggests an affirmative answer to this 
question, for the Court has spoken with abundant clarity in Printz v. 
United States.
363
 In Printz, the Court struck down, in no uncertain 
terms, a federal statute requiring local law-enforcement officers to 
submit prospective handgun-purchaser background-check requests to 
the federal government: “Today we hold that Congress cannot . . . 
conscript[] the States’ officers directly. . . . [S]uch commands are 




In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked to history and 
recounted a particularly compelling analogue to today’s detainer 
regulation. The First Congress enacted a law aimed at holding 
federal prisoners in state jails.
365
 The Court found it significant that 
the statute “issued not a command to the States’ executive, but a 
recommendation to their legislatures.”
366
 Rather than passing 
legislation compelling the states to house federal prisoners, Congress 
“‘recommended to the legislatures of the several States to pass laws, 
making it expressly the duty of the keepers of their goals, to receive 
and safe keep therein all prisoners committed under the authority of 
the United States,’ and offered to pay 50 cents per month for each 
prisoner.”
367
 When one state failed to comply, “Congress’s only 
reaction was a law authorizing the marshal in any State that failed to 
 
 362. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2012). 
 363. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 364. Id. at 935. In a separate article I trace the history of the Tenth Amendment across the 
issues of fugitive slave rendition and fugitive criminal rendition, demonstrating the persistence of 
Tenth Amendment issues in rendition and the use of the Tenth Amendment as a means of civil 
rights resistance to rendition. Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance: Civil Rights 
Opposition to the Rendition of Fugitive Slaves, Interstate Criminals, and Suspected Immigration 
Violators, Section III.B (Nov. 11, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review) (selected for presentation at the 2013 annual conference of the Association 
of American Law Schools (AALS) by the Immigration and Civil Rights sections of the AALS). 
 365. Printz, 521 U.S. at 909; Act of Sept. 23, 1789, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 96. 
 366. Printz, 521 U.S. at 909. 
 367. Id. (citing Act of Sept. 23, 1789, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 96 (1789)). 
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comply with the Recommendation of September 23, 1789, to rent a 
temporary jail until provision for a permanent one could be made.”
368
 
As discussed above, Congress appears to have taken care to 
avoid Tenth Amendment issues in its crafting of the detainer statute. 
Either Section 287(d) ought to be read as not requiring prolonged 
detention at all, or it ought to be read as permitting federal officials 
to issue an immigration detainer to state and local officials only upon 
their request in the first instance.
369
 Had Congress written INA 
§ 287(d) to require (rather than permit) local law enforcement 
officials to report controlled substance arrestees suspected of being 
immigration violators and to require (rather than permit) those local 
officials to request immigration officials to “determine promptly 
whether or not to issue a detainer,”
370
 the facts would be virtually 
indistinguishable from Printz. 
But while Congress carefully crafted the detainer statute to 
avoid Tenth Amendment problems,
371
 the same cannot be said of the 
immigration detainer regulation, which does purport to compel state 
officials to enforce its provisions.
372
 The holding of Printz and the 
example cited by the Court showing the lack of federal power to 
compel state jailers to hold federal prisoners demonstrate that the 
detainer regulation exceeds federal authority to compel state officials 
to act. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Court proceeded cautiously in Arizona, nimbly sidestepping 
the hot-button issues that have dominated the political debate which 
gave birth to the case: racial profiling in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause, prolonged detention in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, and the question of whether the states have “inherent 
 
 368. Id. at 910 (citing Resolution of Mar. 3, 1791, 1 Stat. 225). 
 369. See supra Part III.B; Immigration and Nationality Act, § 287(d)(3), 66 Stat. 233 (1952) 
(codified as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d)(3) (2006)). 
 370. Compare Immigration and Nationality Act, § 287(d), 66 Stat. 233 (codified as amended 
8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2006)) (permitting state officials to initiate action), with Pub. L. 103-159, 107 
Stat. 1536 (Nov. 30, 1993) (portion of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act struck down in 
Printz) (requiring state officials to initiate action). 
 371. Congress left control in the hands of local law enforcement officials to decide for 
themselves when to bring a controlled substance arrestee to the attention of federal immigration 
officials, ensuring INA § 287(d) avoided any Tenth Amendment unfunded mandate problems. 
 372. 8 C.F.R § 287.7(d) (2012). 
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authority” to police immigration. Nonetheless, the Arizona opinion 
represents a strong accretion of federal authority over immigration 
enforcement, striking down three of the contested provisions and 
leaving the fourth denuded of whatever new state police power 
Arizona had attempted to breathe into the provision. 
The Court was clear in its pronouncement: the states may not 
enforce civil immigration law except as explicitly authorized by 
Congress—to do so would be “not the system Congress created.”
373
 
But while generally providing a ringing endorsement of federal 
power, Arizona also contains the seeds of a challenge to the 
unbridled power of the federal executive branch to pursue 
immigration enforcement objectives. The executive branch, like the 
states, has an obligation to implement “the system Congress created” 
and none other. The Arizona opinion leaves little doubt that the 
detainer regulation, by which immigration officials may issue a 
command to state officials to detain prisoners who would otherwise 
be freed, upon no basis other than that “investigation has been 
initiated,” is “not the system Congress created.” The detainer 
regulation also raises substantial constitutional questions, including 
the Fourth Amendment issue raised by prolonged detention—the 
precise concern raised by the Justices concerning implementation of 
the “show me your papers” provision of S.B. 1070. It is clear that 
detention, as envisioned by the detainer regulation, must comply 
with the Fourth Amendment; it must be supported by probable cause 
and meet the Riverside requirement of prompt neutral review.
374
 
While beyond the scope of this Article, Arizona also poses 
questions for state and local law enforcement officials who might 
consider holding a prisoner pursuant to an immigration detainer. First 
is the question of whether state police power can justify such 
detention. If, as I suggest, the detainer cannot serve as legal 
authorization for prolonging detention, state and local officials must 
derive the authority elsewhere—the police power being the natural 
choice. Arizona leaves open the question of whether state officials 
 
 373. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012). 
 374. This Article has examined only the impact Arizona has upon the validity of the federal 
detainer regulation. An analysis of how state and local officials are impacted by Arizona is 
beyond the scope of the Article. But it is likely that given the absence of federal authority in 
support of detainers, state officials will be hard pressed to justify prolonged detention. 
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have any authority to pursue immigration enforcement—either civil 
or criminal—as a matter of the state police power. Arizona also 
leaves open the possibility that, in the case of criminal enforcement, 
whatever state police power exists to support detention may in fact 
be preempted by federal law. 
A second question state and local officials must answer is 
whether prolonged detention can be accomplished consistently with 
the Fourth Amendment. Arizona makes clear that prolonged 
detention raises Fourth Amendment concerns, but does not answer 
any of the specific questions raised by the prolonged detention of a 
suspected immigration violator on the basis of what little information 
is contained in the standard immigration detainer form. 
Arizona answers some questions clearly and leaves others 
unanswered. Given the Court’s narrow focus and avoidance of the 
larger questions raised by the case, the decision likely will do little to 
stem the tide of state immigration enforcement measures and their 
accompanying legal challenges, as states seek to discover the limits 
of what the Court held to be their unpreempted power. Nor will 
Arizona end the civil rights debates that will continue to accompany 
immigration enforcement efforts on both the federal and state level. 
The battles continue in Arizona. Just weeks after the Court 
declined to strike down Section 2(B), advocacy groups sought once 
again to enjoin Arizona from implementing that provision.
375
 The 
district court held it was bound by Arizona to allow the provision to 
take effect,
376
 and enforcement began on September 18, 2012. The 
Ninth Circuit declined to grant an emergency injunction halting 
enforcement, but Arizona’s governor said she was under “no 
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